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Executive Summary
To examine the incidence, frequency, size of verdicts and other aspects
of the medical malpractice system in Illinois, this study looked at statewide
data where available, and concentrated on two regions: Cook and DuPage
counties, which comprise almost half the population of the state of Illinois and
two-thirds of its doctors; in addition it examined Madison and St. Clair
counties, which have been characterized as “judicial hellholes.”
For Cook and DuPage counties:
•

The data show no upward trends in filings or in filings per 100
treating physicians from 1994 through 2004, when adjusted for
population growth.

•

By one measure there was a modest decrease in medical
malpractice trials between 1996 and 2001. Plaintiff win rates
increased, but this change may be ascribed to other factors related
to how cases are selected for trial.

•

A different set of data showed no increase in jury trials or in
plaintiff win-rates between 2001 and 2004.

•

Settlement mechanisms such as pre-verdict high-low agreements,
acceptance of the limits of the doctor’s insurance policy and other
devices showed that many jury verdicts were substantially reduced
in the post-verdict phase of the lawsuit.

A similar analysis in Madison and St. Clair counties reveals the
following:
•

Over a 14-year period from 1992 through the first part of 2005,
only 11 jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff in medical malpractice
cases were found in Madison and St. Clair county courts. Only two
verdicts exceeded $1 million.
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•

There is no evidence to support the perception that medical
malpractice jury trials in these counties are frequent or that jury
verdicts for plaintiffs are outrageous.

•

Insofar as medical malpractice litigation is concerned, the
reputation of Madison and St. Clair counties as “judicial hellholes”
is not justified.

An analysis of the data from Cook and DuPage counties revealed that a
$500,000 cap on non-economic damages would have resulted in a minimal
reduction in overall payouts to plaintiffs and would be unlikely to affect
doctors’ liability insurance premiums. But such a cap would result in
significantly reduced compensation for some individual plaintiffs who suffered
catastrophic injuries through medical negligence.
An analysis of data from the American Medical Association does not support
the claims that Illinois in general and Madison and St. Clair counties in
particular are losing doctors:
•

There has been a steady increase in the absolute number of
Illinois’ total patient care physicians, including OB-GYNs and
neurological surgeons.

•

American Medical Association statistics through 2003 do not
support claims of a loss of doctors in Madison and St. Clair
counties.

The Illinois tort system does not appear to be the cause of the undisputed fact
that doctors’ liability insurance premiums showed dramatic rises. It is time to
consider other causes of the insurance premium increase.
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Chapter 1
Investigating the Tort System as the Cause of Medical Liability Insurance
Increases
Let us be clear from the beginning. There is no dispute about the fact
that, beginning about the year 2001, the medical liability insurance premiums
for some doctors rose very dramatically in Illinois as they did elsewhere in the
U.S. Thus, it is reported that one obstetrician-gynecologist saw his malpractice
liability insurance premium jump from $138,031 in 2003 to $230,428 in
2004.1 Such increases are a serious impediment to practicing doctors and
ultimately could have major effects not only on their incomes, but also on the
viability of their practices and the health care of the patients they serve.
The cause of the problem is hotly contested. Physicians, insurance
companies and business organizations assert that the cause of the problem is
the tort system in which patients file lawsuits against their doctors claiming
medical negligence resulted in a serious injury. Then, they say, attempts to
settle the lawsuit center on the likelihood that juries will be unfairly biased in
favor of finding negligence and awarding unjustified large sums of money to the
patient. In particular, they say, there is great fear of an outrageous award for
“pain and suffering” above and beyond money for any incurred medical costs
and lost income. Doctors and their liability insurers are forced to agree to
inflated settlements because of fear that if the case goes to trial they will likely
suffer even greater economic losses. This is called the “shadow effect” of jury
trials.
The President of the Illinois Hospital Association is quoted as saying that
large awards have risen dramatically in both size and frequency since the year
2000 and hospitals in Cook County said that their situation was especially
dire.2
Georgina Gustin and Phil Dine, Lax Insurance Regulation is Core of Malpractice Crisis, SAINT
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, January 1, 2005.
2 Daniel Vock, Legislators take Med-Mal Deadlock Head-on, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN
February 23, 2005.
1
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Madison and St. Clair counties in southwestern Illinois have received
particular attention and have been characterized as “judicial hellholes” where
juries have made unjustified awards.3
In contrast, plaintiff lawyers and consumer groups offer a different
explanation for the problem. These groups assert that the cause lies with the
business cycle in the medical insurance industry, claiming that the cycles are
recurrent. In their view the problem is that insurers under-price premiums in
good economic times and under-estimate future payouts. In addition
downturns in the bond and stock markets where insurers invest their reserves
add to the financial problems. The end result, these groups claim, is that when
economic fluctuations in the business cycle squeeze income, the insurers raise
their rates and blame plaintiff lawyers and juries.4
The Illinois State Bar Association, with 30,000 members, is the largest
bar association in Illinois. It is a voluntary-membership association that
provides a wide range of professional services for lawyers, and education and
services for the public. Its membership includes lawyers representing plaintiffs
and defendants in civil matters, as well as lawyers practicing in many other
fields of law. This organization commissioned me to research the tort system as
it pertains to medical malpractice litigation in Illinois. The tort system is only
one part of the debate, but providing information about certain questions can
shed important light on contentious issues: Have medical malpractice claims
increased? Have jury trials increased? Have jury awards for medical
malpractice increased? Have Madison and St. Clair counties earned their
reputation as “judicial hellholes” insofar as medical malpractice claims are
concerned? Is there evidence that doctors are leaving the state or certain areas
of the state as a result of jury awards?
I was chosen to undertake this research because I have been studying
and writing about medical malpractice litigation since 1990. In addition to
Anonymous, Madison County: Bush in the “Hellhole, ST. LOUIS TODAY, January 5, 2005;”
William Lamb, Illinois Trauma Cases Surge at SLU, STL TODAY, January 10, 2005.
4 Joseph Treaster and Joel Brinkley, Behind those Medical Malpractice Rate Hikes, 151 CHICAGO
DAILY LAW BULLETIN (February 22, 2005),
3
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various articles in scholarly journals and law reviews, I wrote a book on the
subject, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the Myths
about Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets and Outrageous Damage Awards,
University of Michigan Press (1995).
Writing books and articles does not come without the possibility of being
perceived to have a bias. Although, as the title of the book implies, I drew the
conclusion that many claims about irresponsible juries in medical malpractice
trials were unwarranted, my conclusions were based on careful, systematic
empirical research. Plaintiff lawyers, not surprisingly, liked the book’s
conclusions, but I also received praise in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, which said: “Tort reformers have often portrayed juries in medical
malpractice cases as overly generous and irresponsible…. In Medical
Malpractice and the American Jury, the author successfully counters this
portrayal with a well-reasoned, painstaking analysis of jury verdicts and
damage awards….”
When I agreed to undertake the present research, the Illinois State Bar
Association understood that I would draw conclusions based on whatever the
evidence led me to conclude and that no restrictions would be placed on what I
wrote in the report.
Because the topic is contentious and interpretations open to questions, I
undertook the research with a safeguard: transparency. All of the research data
will be made available to any person or group that requests it. This is actually
an easy task since I drew most of my conclusions from data sources that are
readily available to the public or, in the case of verdict reports, can be obtained
with little effort by interest groups.
Data Sources
In the chapters that follow I describe the data sources, but a brief
recitation here will be helpful. One primary source was verdict reporters. These
included the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter and the Southwestern Illinois
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Jury Verdict Reporter. These data were supplemented by databases on verdicts
and appellate courts available in Westlaw, Lexis, and Findlaw, primary on-line
commercial sources used by legal researchers. The Cook County Jury Verdict
Reporter is one of the oldest and most comprehensive sources of data for Cook
and DuPage counties and, as I discovered, more comprehensive than other
verdict reporters and more comprehensive than databases on verdicts compiled
by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics. In addition,
when crucial information was missing from verdict reports, I placed telephone
calls to lawyers involved in the case and obtained that information.
The Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter covers Madison and St.
Clair counties and is available on-line through Westlaw and Lexis. I personally
checked the accuracy of the Madison County reports by traveling to
Edwardsville and reviewing every one of the medical malpractice verdicts it
listed, finding no errors in the summaries, although in some instances I
uncovered supplemental information about the cases.
I also researched the data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of
the U.S. Department of Justice. As will be described in Chapter 3, the BJS in
collaboration with the National Center for State Courts, as part of its Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts, conducted nationwide surveys of civil jury
verdicts in 1996 and 2001. Those surveys included the courts in Cook and
DuPage counties. The data are archived by the Inter-university Consortium of
Political and Social Science Data at the University of Michigan. I extracted the
data for Cook and DuPage counties for those years.
Another source of data was the American Medical Association’s annual
report, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US. This report
describes all non-federal doctors by state and separately by counties, including
information about general areas of the doctor’s practice. I compiled data for
Illinois as a whole and separately for Cook, DuPage, Madison and St. Clair
counties from 1993 through 2003. Information on 2004 will not be available for
another year.
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Where relevant the analyses were adjusted for population and inflation
using census data and the Consumer Price Index.
In addition to these sources I researched the National Practitioner Data
Bank. Created as part of the 1986 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, the NPDB reports on malpractice payments made on behalf of doctors by
malpractice insurers. The reports are confidential but the NPDB makes a
public file available that removes personal identifying information. I extracted
data for Illinois that covered the years 1991 through 2004. A Wall Street
Journal report criticized the NPDB as omitting many important cases, raising
questions about its comprehensiveness.5 Then, as I began to sift through the
data I found so many omissions of information that I concluded it was so
unreliable as to be of little use for this research.6 I therefore omit it from
further consideration in this report.
An Unavailable Source
One important source of data is missing from this report. The Illinois
Department of Insurance compiles detailed records of closed medical
malpractice claims that it requires medical malpractice liability insurers to
report. In 2001 the Department compiled a report covering the years 1980
through 1999.7 Unlike the states of Florida and Texas the data are not made
available to the public. I attempted to gain access to the data collected since
1999 to bring findings up to date. Unfortunately, despite a number of requests
to gain access to the data, the Department of Insurance permission was not
given. The data would have provided crucial information bearing on the
controversy about medical malpractice litigation. The closed claims files
5 Joseph Hallinan, Doctor is Out: Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases is Often Thwarted--Deleting a Physician’s Name from a Suit Before Settling Keeps it Out of Data Bank, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, August 27, 2004 at A1.
6 For example, on a variable purporting to tell the forum in which a claim was settled, fully 33
percent of cases were classified in a category called “unknown /before lawsuit” or were just
blank. The data are supposed to report the severity of the injury but 97% of cases had no
information on this variable.
7 CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SECTION, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
STUDY (2001).
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contain information about the frequency and magnitude of settlements as well
as verdicts as well as the costs of defending those claims. Studies using the
Florida and Texas databases demonstrate how valuable a resource closed claim
data can be in shedding light on this important and controversial debate.8
The Remaining Chapters of This Report
Chapter 2 contains a very brief overview of information about medical
malpractice litigation to provide laypersons background information about the
subject and give them intellectual tools to understand data that is presented in
the following chapters. The chapter presents only minimal information about a
complex subject. References to sources discussing the topics in greater depth
are provided in the footnotes.
Chapter 3 is about Cook and DuPage counties. These two counties
contain 49 percent of Illinois’ total population and approximately two-thirds of
its private doctors.9 I examined medical malpractice filings and jury verdicts in
those counties as summarized by the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter,
supplemented with additional research from on-line databanks and my
telephone calls to the offices of lawyers involved in the cases.
Chapter 4 deals with jury verdicts in Madison and St. Clair counties. As
noted above, these two counties have gained notoriety as “judicial hellholes” for
defendants and have played a prominent role in the claims about the need for
medical malpractice tort reform. I used the Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict
Reporter as my initial source, but supplemented it with a two-day visit
examining the case files in the Madison County courthouse.

8 See Neil Vidmar et al.., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315 (2005); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not
Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (2005, in press), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678601.
9 Illinois also has doctors who are employees of the federal government. The doctors are not
affected by the liability insurance problem because they are insured by the federal government.
And lawsuits against them must be adjudicated under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
requires trial by judge alone.
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Chapter 5 turns to the very contentious and often misunderstood topic of
“pain and suffering.” Using the plaintiff verdicts from Cook and DuPage
counties and studies by other researchers the report explores the role of “pain
and suffering” in jury verdicts and the potential impact of a $500,000 cap on
these damages.
Chapter 6 looks at changes in the availability of treating doctors in
Illinois and Cook, DuPage, Madison and St. Clair counties from 1993 through
2003. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the question of whether
the availability of treating doctors has changed over the years.
Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions and limitations of the research.
What This Report Does Not Cover
The report is descriptive and does not pass judgment on the correctness
or fairness of the individual jury verdicts that are reported, although it raises
issues that will assist readers in drawing their own conclusions. Nevertheless,
different parties will have different interpretations of the verdicts. The same
reasoning applies to data about settlements.
The report does not investigate the economics or practices of the medical
liability insurance industry. That subject is beyond my research mandate and
areas of expertise. The findings about the tort system will raise questions about
that subject, but they will have to be made by inference. The inference will be
made explicit in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Medical Negligence and the Tort System: A Brief Primer for Laypersons
The tort system has many facets that bear on the controversy about
medical negligence. This chapter is intended to describe some of the issues and
empirical findings from other states as background and context for interpreting
the Illinois data that I describe in subsequent chapters of this report. Each
state has its own laws and legal culture, but, nevertheless, there are many
similarities across states. The reader should be aware that there is a very
substantial literature bearing on each of the topics discussed in this chapter.10
It is intended only to provide guidance for other chapters in this report.
Readers are encouraged to consult original sources referenced in the
footnotes.11
Purposes of the Tort System
There are two central purposes to the tort system: (1) to compensate
persons who are injured through the negligence of others and (2) to deter
future negligent behavior in (a) the person who committed the instant act of
negligence and (b) deter other persons from similar negligence by informing
them that they might face civil liability if they engaged in similar acts of
negligence.
Compensation in tort law as it has developed in the United States
involves awards of monetary damages for losses. There are two main categories
of losses. In Illinois they are commonly referred to as “economic” and “noneconomic” losses. For reasons that will be made clearer in Chapter 5, the latter

10 Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 N ENGL. J. MED.283 (2004) provides an excellent
review of the history of contemporary problems of medical liability insurance. See also,
Michelle Mello et al. The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF
MEDICINE 2281 (2003); Peter Akmajian, A Fair and Balanced Look at Tort Reform, FOR THE
DEFENSE 33 (November 2004); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE
AWARDS (1995); 54 DePaul Law Review Issue Number 2 (2005) (Whole Issue).
11 Many of the footnotes contain references to my own writings because they summarize the
other literature and offer citations to the original sources.

8

term can be a source of confusion for non-lawyers, but for now I will use both
terms.
“Economic losses” are losses like medical expenses and lost income that
result directly from the act of negligence. There are usually tangible hospital
bills and tax receipts to prove past economic losses. Health care experts and
accountants can use these records of the past to make projections about future
“economic” losses and present them to a judge or jury in the form of expert
testimony. The estimates of economic losses are sometimes hotly disputed, but
at least it is relatively easy to calculate them using the metric of dollars.
“Non-economic losses” have a much less tangible nature and it is difficult
to apply an exact dollar metric. Non-economic losses frequently are described
as “pain and suffering.” How does anyone place an exact dollar figure on
someone’s pain?
A primary source of confusion with the term “non-economic” losses,
however, is that pain and suffering is not the only element of this category of
damages. There are other elements such as disfigurement, loss of
companionship or loss of consortium; loss of moral guidance; loss of sexual
gratification, and survival pain.12 Non-economic damages are called “general
damages” in many states. By either name they are losses for which there is no
clear dollar metric by which to judge them.
In practical fact many of the legally-recognized categories of “noneconomic” damages have economic consequences. For example, if someone’s
face is horribly disfigured it will probably cause social stigma and personal
pain, but the injury may well have economic implications such as the person’s
ability to obtain a well-paying job or finding a spouse. Should the amount differ
if the disfigured person is 10-years-old or 70-years-old? “Wrongful death” is
another category. To be sure there can be severe emotional pain for survivors
but there may also be severe economic consequences for surviving children or

Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross and Mary Rose, Jury Awards For Medical Malpractice and PostVerdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW 265,287 (1998).
12
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for a surviving spouse or parents who were counting on the deceased person to
render support and sustenance in their old age.
In our legal system the difficult task of assigning a monetary award for
these less easily grasped losses has been left to the judgment of a jury. The
theory behind having a jury decide is that it is composed of citizens from the
community who will apply community norms to evaluate the injury’s worth.
The jurors are instructed by the judge to apply their “common sense and
judgment” in deciding what amount is appropriate in this particular case.
Community norms in Arcola, Gillespie or Cairo may be different from Rockford
or Chicago.
The deterrent effect of tort law is controversial. There are some who say
that were it not for the threat of lawsuits there would be more medical
negligence. Other persons insist that the threat of medical malpractice causes
doctors to order unnecessary tests out of fear that they may be sued if
something goes wrong. No one, including doctors, disagrees with the need to
take steps to prevent unnecessary injuries, but the issue is whether the threat
causes costly unnecessary medicine. Empirical evidence on deterrence and
over-deterrence is difficult to prove one way or the other.

13

Medical Negligence Occurs
A Harvard University study of medical malpractice concluded that one
out of every 100 patients admitted to a hospital had an actionable legal claim
based on medical negligence. Some of these patients’ injuries were minor or
transient but 14 percent of the time the injury resulted in death and as many
as another 7 percent of patients suffered a permanent disability. Generally, the
more serious the injury the more likely it was caused by negligence. Some of
the Harvard findings have been contested, but other studies, including one

For a review of these issues see Michelle Mello and Troyen Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory And Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1595 (2002).
13
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conducted in Illinois, have supported the findings and made estimates of
negligence that are even higher.14
Injuries Can Have High Costs
If someone becomes paralyzed from the neck or waist down, they usually
cannot work. If they are young and have children the income loss as well as
medical expenses can be much more. A baby with a severe brain injury may
require constant attention to avoid bedsores and other illnesses and be subject
to infections. In the very recent past, many of these children had short lives.
Yet, with today’s advances in medicine many can be expected to live many
decades. Life sustenance is an absolute moral obligation for most such
instances, but there are enormous financial consequences.
A 1998 study of injuries caused by medical negligence undertaken by
two economists conservatively estimated that the average economic costs for a
brain-injured child was $2.25 million in today’s dollars; persons who survived
serious emergency room incidents had economic losses of over $2 million. In
both of these estimates there was considerable variability between persons:
some economic losses were much lower and in some cases they were much
higher.15
Advances in medicine over the past decade and a half have sometimes
extended survival time and improved the lives of these persons, but here again
the benefits come with very major economic liabilities.

PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993) . PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993); PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); LINDA KOHN, JANET CORRIGAN AND
MOLLA DONALDSON, EDS., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE ( 2000) at <http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9728.html?onpi_newsdoc112999>; Lucian
Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 95 (2000).; Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in
Situ;Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 357 (2005).
15 Frank Sloan and Stephen van Wert, Costs of Injuries, Chapter 7 in FRANK SLOAN ET AL.,
SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993)
14
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The Incidence of Claims is Lower than the Incidence of Injury
The Harvard study concluded that for every person filing a claim of
medical negligence, eight times as many patients injured by medical negligence
did not file a claim. Other studies have yielded similar estimates. One possible
reason for this low claiming rate is that the patient does not discover the
medical negligence. Another reason is that plaintiff lawyers carefully screen
cases and select those that have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial
and whose potential award justifies an investment of money, sometimes many
thousands of dollars, to hire experts and many working hours before and
during trial to prove the medical negligence.16
Most Cases Are Settled Without a Jury Trial
Only between 7 and 10 percent of claims go to trial by judge and jury.
Somewhere between 40 to 50 percent of claims are eventually dropped by the
patient during “discovery”–the pre-trial investigative stage in which the
plaintiff’s lawyer obtains the medical records, hires experts, and questions the
defendant’s experts. Of course, even in these no-payment cases the costs for
defendants and their liability insurers can be expensive since they too have to
pay for lawyers, experts and other litigation costs.17
Recent research in Florida has shown that as many as 26% of medical
malpractice claims that result in payment to the claimant are settled by the
health care provider through arbitration or without a formal lawsuit ever being
filed. Even for claims resulting in more than a million dollars in payments 10
percent were settled without a formal lawsuit. Under 8 percent of cases with
million dollar payments were settled after a jury trial. Of 34 cases resulting in
payments over $5 million only two were decided by juries.18

PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
17 Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The Contingency
Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 101 (2005).
18 Neil Vidmar, et al., Uncovering the “ Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW315 (2005).
16
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Doctors and their insurance companies say that, nevertheless, they settle
cases even for large amounts out of fear that if the case goes before a jury the
amounts will be astronomically higher. This is called the “shadow effect” of jury
trials. In contrast, some research findings suggest that insurers settle cases
when their own internal investigation indicates that negligence did occur.
However, even in such cases where negligence is judged to be likely, there may
be great disagreement with the plaintiff about the amount of damages he or she
should receive.19
Regardless of whether the claim results in payment or no payment or
whether it goes to jury trial or is settled without trial, the process of resolution
is slow. Between three and six years typically elapse between the filing of a
lawsuit and final resolution. Some cases take even longer.20
Many Malpractice Claims Have Multiple Defendants
Because of specialization in the health care field, multiple persons may
treat a patient: a primary doctor, a surgeon, a radiologist, an anesthesiologist
and hospital nurses and other staff. Sometimes at the beginning of a lawsuit it
is not clear which health care provider is responsible for the alleged negligent
injury. Later some defendants may be dropped from the claim. In other
instances the lawsuit will assert that multiple parties are responsible for the
alleged negligent outcome.21
For some cases that eventually go to trial, one or more defendants may
settle with the patient before trial. What this means is that sometimes a

19 Ralph Peeples, et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of
Standard of Care, 37, WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 877 (2002); Mark Taragin et al., The Influence
of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1780 (1992); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay
on Patient Interests, The Contingency Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW
REVIEW 101 (2005).
20 Id. See also, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS STUDY, (2001);
MARK KREIDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIMS STUDY, Department of Insurance
Commissioner, State of Washington (February, 2005).
21 NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT
JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995).
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plaintiff who loses at trial may have received money from other parties that
were sued. Very often hospitals named as defendants because their staff was
indirectly involved in the patient’s treatment settle for relatively small amounts.
By relatively small I mean small compared to the patient’s overall damages
claim. The hospital may decide to settle to avoid the risk that at trial they could
be held accountable for a much larger award, even though the hospital does
not believe it is negligent. Often the amount of any prior settlement from one
defendant will be “set off,” that is, deducted from the award the jury levies
against the other defendants.22
Doctors Win Most Jury Trials
Research on medical malpractice trials across the country indicates that
when the case goes to trial the juries decide in favor of the plaintiff only
between 20 to 30 percent of the time. The causes of variability in win rates
across states or over time are difficult to determine. While one explanation is
that juries differ, other plausible explanations are that the strengths of claims
differ, that lawyers vary in the cases they select for trial, and that negotiation
and settlement dynamics differ over time and places. In short the data cannot
tell us whether juries decide cases differently or whether juries decide different
cases.
These statistics surprise many people. Part of the problem is that
newspapers tend to report only cases with prevailing plaintiffs being awarded
large sums of money while ignoring cases with smaller sums or cases in which
defendants prevail.
Interviews with jurors who decided cases found that jurors view many
claims with skepticism. They often expressed two interrelated views, namely
that too many people want to get something for nothing and that doctors
should not be blamed for simple human misjudgment.23

22
23

Id.
Id.
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Deciding Negligence and Compensation in Medical Malpractice Cases
The first task of a jury or judge is to determine if negligence occurred and
if that negligence was the direct cause of the injury that the patient suffered. In
many areas of tort law jurors are instructed to apply a “reasonable person” test
to determine negligence, but in medical malpractice claims there is a different
test—the medical standard of care used by doctors in the particular area of
practice. With some rare exceptions, at trial the plaintiff is required to call an
expert (or experts) proficient in that field of medicine to testify that he or she
has concluded that the defendant doctor violated the standard of care. The
defendant doctor usually also calls experts who have a different opinion. Each
side’s witnesses are cross-examined by the opposing lawyer.
There is also the issue of causation. Many medical procedures have a
risk of an “iatrogenic” injury or illness. An infection may develop at the site of a
surgical procedure or a prescribed drug may interact with a particular patient’s
biological system no matter how careful the doctor is in following the standard
of care. Many persons who seek medical care are already suffering from serious
illnesses or injuries and the contentious issue is whether the bad outcome was
a result of negligent treatment or the underlying disease or injury. A doctor
might even admit negligence but argue that the negligence was not the
proximal cause of the bad outcome.
In deciding liability the jury has the facts and arguments from both sides
on the standard of care and theories of causation. The judge instructs them
that to prevail the plaintiff must prove the case on the “balance of
probabilities.” Unlike a criminal trial which uses a “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard, the judge explains that the balance of probabilities means “more
likely than not.” Judges usually refrain from using exact figures but find
interesting ways to say the jurors must be convinced that, compared to the
defendant’s evidence, there is at least a fifty-one percent likelihood that the
plaintiff’s evidence is correct.
If the jury decides a doctor is liable it must then assess the damages.
During the trial the jury will also have heard evidence about the past and
15

future medical, income or other economic losses of the patient that resulted
from the negligence. The jurors will also have heard evidence bearing on the
plaintiff’s emotional and physical experiences that are an alleged consequence
of the injury.
The jurors will also be instructed to apply their best skills in determining
the worth of the non-economic damages, being neither generous nor stingy.
Debates can ensue about whether some elements of damages such as
disfigurement are non-economic losses since serious disfigurements may affect
employment or marriage opportunities.
Punitive damages, even for behavior that is wanton, malicious, or
fraudulent, are not allowed in Illinois for defendants in medical malpractice
cases.
Trial by Judge and Jury
The jury’s task in a medical malpractice trial is not an easy one, but
often overlooked in debates about jury trials is that it is really trial by judge
and jury. The judge rules on the evidence that is admissible and instructs the
jury on the law. Equally important, the jury’s verdict does not become
legitimate or enforceable until the judge enters a “judgment” on the verdict.
Having seen and heard the same evidence as the jury, the judge can set part or
all of the verdict aside and order a new trial, enter a directed verdict for one or
all of the defendants or reduce the amount of the damages if the judge feels the
verdict is inconsistent with the trial evidence. Additionally, if the case is
appealed, a panel of three or more judges may overturn parts or all of the
judgment. Specific examples of judicial oversight may be seen in cases
summarized in Chapters 3 and 4. In short, the jury verdict is not the final
word.
Jury Competence
Questions are sometimes raised about whether the jury, composed of a
group of laypersons, is competent to make the complicated decisions required
16

in malpractice cases. Likewise, it would be absurd to claim that juries always
get it right; but one study found that jury verdicts were generally consistent
with evaluations of whether negligence occurred that were made by neutral
doctors. Other studies, while not specifically dealing with medical malpractice,
show that trial judges agree with civil jury verdicts most of the time. These
studies will not satisfy every critique because the decisions are judgment calls.
Each side will contend that the evidence favored their position. Chapters 3 and
4 present short summaries of a number of cases and the juries’ verdicts. Even
though readers will not have heard the evidence that the jury heard, the
summaries allow different readers to make their own evaluations. It is
noteworthy that in most cases the trial judge agreed with the jury verdict—but
not always.24
Jury Awards Do Not Necessarily Reflect the Final Payment to the Plaintiff
Cases are often settled for less than the jury’s award. This is particularly
true of very large awards. There are four main processes by which awards are
reduced. The trial judge or an appeals court may reduce the award. Sometimes
the two sides agree to a high-low agreement before trial, during trial or even
during jury deliberations. This occurs in cases where both sides are not
entirely confident about the strength of their case and become risk averse.
They enter into an agreement that no matter what the jury decides the
defendant will pay a certain amount to the plaintiff and if the plaintiff wins the
defendant will have to pay only the agreed highest amount. Chapter 3 provides
some good examples.
Sometimes a winning plaintiff will settle for less than the jury verdict in
order to avoid a long delay in payment and the risk of losing if the defendant
appeals. Finally, plaintiffs usually settle for the limits of the doctor(s) liability
insurance coverage if the award exceeds the insurance coverage. Hospitals that

Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The Contingency
Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 101 (2005).
24
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are self-insured usually have some form of excess liability insurance to protect
their assets.25
Chapters 3 and 4 contain examples bearing on all of these post-trial
adjustments in Illinois cases.
Liens Against Recovery
If a patient is injured through medical negligence, his or her medical bills
may be paid by taxpayer-supported Medicare or Medicaid, or by a private
insurer like Blue Cross/Blue Shield. If the injured person cannot work, a
private or public source may pay some or all of their expected wages. If the
injured person subsequently receives a jury award or settlement from a
negligent medical provider, that entity has a right to recover that portion of the
award that it paid in benefits as a result of the injury. Medicare and Medicaid
are required to seek reimbursement. There is very little accurate information on
the extent to which this occurs and the degree of recovery but plaintiff lawyers
deal with liens routinely even before they start a lawsuit. The amount
taxpayers and private health insurers recover may amount to hundreds of
thousands or even millions of dollars from malpractice settlements every
year.26
Doctors Who Are Federal Employees or State Employees
A number of doctors and other health care providers are employees of the
federal government. Some examples are doctors on military bases or Veterans
Administration hospitals. These doctors may provide regular medical services
including delivering babies. They too can be sued but their employer is the selfinsured United States government. The doctors do not carry private
professional liability insurance. Federal employees must be sued under the
25 Id.; Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Code of the Personal Injury Bar, 35
LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 257 (2002).
26 See HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES (2004); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient
Interests, The Contingency Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
101 (2005).
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Federal Tort Claims Act that provides for trial by judge alone rather than trial
by jury.
Some healthcare providers are employees of the State of Illinois and are
insured by the State of Illinois, for example, state mental hospital employees.
The laws of Sovereign Immunity may not shield claims of medical malpractice
against these employees and in such cases claims may be decided in a jury
trial.27
Summary
This chapter has presented a minimal sketch of important issues and
concepts related to medical malpractice litigation. It is a complicated subject.
The sketch will be helpful to laypersons in the chapters that follow.

See, e.g. Jinkins v. Lee and Medlin, 04L-5967 (Cook County), Access Plus Jury Verdict
(Tried September 27-October 7, 2004).
27
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Chapter 3
Medical Malpractice Litigation in Cook and DuPage Counties
Cook County and DuPage County are the most populous counties in
Illinois. Cook, with a population of more than 5.3 million persons, constitutes
approximately 42 percent of Illinois’ 12,600,000 citizens, and DuPage, with a
population of over 900,000, accounts for another 7 percent.28 The two
combined represent almost half of Illinois’ 12.6 million citizens. These two
counties also accounted for 67.6% of Illinois’ 30,264 non-federal “patient care”
physicians in 2003.29 A number of sources of data bearing on medical
malpractice litigation are available for these two counties. This chapter draws
upon those data sources to present a profile of case filings over time, verdicts
after trial, and post-verdict adjustments to awards. Additionally, some data
give insights about settlements.
Case Filings in Cook and DuPage Counties: 1994-2004
The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter compiles statistics on annual
filings of civil litigation. John Kirkton of the Reporter compiled separate
statistics for medical malpractice filings in Cook and DuPage counties from
1994 through 2004.30 These data shed light on the extent to which medical
malpractice lawsuits have increased over the past decade.
Before presenting these data a note of caution is in order. Case filings do
not always translate into settlements or jury verdicts. In some instances the
filing enables a plaintiff’s lawyer to obtain medical records and other material
but further investigation with the help of these records persuades the lawyer

<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17031.html>
See American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S.,
2003 edition, AMA Press 2003. Federal physicians are those employed or supported by the U.S.
Government, which is self-insured for the liability of its physicians. Lawsuits against its
physicians fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which requires trials to be conducted by
judges acting without a jury.
30 Mr. Kirkton informed me that this compilation was made available to a number of parties on
both sides of the tort reform issue some time before I requested the data.
28
29
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that there is insufficient evidence to continue the lawsuit and it is
abandoned.31 To the extent that this is true the statistics may overestimate the
extent of medical malpractice litigation. On the other hand recent research
bearing on malpractice litigation in Florida32 uncovered the fact that the parties
settled over 20 percent of all cases involving payments to claimants without a
formal lawsuit being filed. For settlements involving payments over $1 million,
slightly more than 10% were settled in a pre-lawsuit phase. To the extent that
similar processes occur in Illinois, case filings may under-estimate payments
by medical health providers and their insurers. Nevertheless, filings provide a
reasonable measure of medical malpractice claiming.
Table 3.1 shows the number of filings in Cook and DuPage counties by
year. In addition Table 1 also presents data on the number of non-federal
treating physicians in each county per year through 2003.33 (Physician figures
for 2004 and 2005 were not available at the time this report was written.) From
these two figures a third variable was constructed to show the number of
lawsuits filed per number of physicians. This last statistic needs to be treated
cautiously since there is a time lag between a medical incident and the filing of
lawsuits. Typically, at least two years elapse between a medical incident and a
claim, but in some cases the lawsuit may be filed many years after the
incident. For instance, a person who was a minor when an incident occurred
may file after he or she reached the age of majority, producing a long lag time.

See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995) at 69-92.
Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from
Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315(2005).
33 There are also treating physicians who are federal employees, such as those associated with
military bases, Veterans Administration hospitals and the Public Health Service. The federal
government assumes professional liability for these physicians. In consequence, malpractice
lawsuits against federal physicians do not play a role in private liability insurance premiums.
31
32

21

Table 3.1: Case Filings, Number of Treating Physicians and Filings Per
Capita of Treating Physicians: 1994-2003
Year

Cook County

DuPage County

Number
of Filings

Number of
Physicians

1994

1831

15,114

Filings/
100
Physicians
12.1

1995

1722

15,579

1996

1235

1997

Number
of Filings

Number of
Physicians

113

2,393

Filings/
100
Physicians
4.7

11.0

119

2,618

4.5

15,673

7.9

80

2,735

2.9

1262

16,298

7.7

70

2,881

2.4

1998

1353

16,043

8.4

60

2,916

2.1

1999

1214

15,835

7.7

70

3,028

2.3

2000

1319

16,205

8.1

60

3,208

1.8

2001

1360

16,339

8.3

60

3,319

1.8

2002

1324

16,266

8.1

80

3,327

2.4

2003

1443

16,782

8.5

60

3,423

1.8

2004

1226

*

*

57

*

*

The table shows that filings from 2000 through 2004 in both Cook and
DuPage counties were substantially lower than in 1994 and 1995. Except for a
decrease in 2004, filings have remained relatively steady since 1998, although
there are some yearly fluctuations. The second column in the table shows that
filings per 100 treating physicians in Cook County remained steady at between
approximately 8 and 8.5 from 1996 through 2003. DuPage County shows a
similar trend although the filing rates are much lower, varying between 1.8 and
2.4 per one 100 physicians.
The much higher rate of filings per 100 physicians in Cook as opposed to
DuPage County appears puzzling. However, an additional examination of
physician statistics suggests a likely explanation for part of the difference. The
AMA’s physician database disaggregates treating physicians into a number of
separate categories and one of those categories is “hospital based practice.”34
American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE US,
editions 1995 –2005.
34
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In Cook County 35 percent of treating physicians in 2003 listed themselves as
engaged in hospital-based practice whereas in DuPage County only 18 percent
listed themselves in this category. To the extent that claims involving medical
incidents are more likely to arise in hospital settings, hospital practice may
explain part of the difference. The demographics of the patients seeking health
care, the types of health services provided and other factors may also
contribute to the higher rate, but the data do not help us further on these
hypotheses.
Once again the reader is cautioned to keep firmly in mind two caveats.
First, filings do not necessarily equate to payments to claimants. Second,
unpaid claims incur defense costs by liability insurers.35 Nevertheless, with
these caveats in mind the principal finding from this analysis is that the data
show no upward trends in filings or in filings per 100 treating physicians in
either Cook or DuPage counties.
Jury Verdicts Over Time: The Bureau of Justice Statistics Research, 1996
and 2001
Much of the current controversy in Illinois involves claims about jury
verdicts increasing in both frequency and magnitude of awarded damages.
Cook and DuPage counties are the two Illinois counties represented in a survey
of nationwide civil court statistics carried out by the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics in collaboration with the National Center
for State Courts. Called the Civil Justice Survey, the civil court records of fortysix of the nation’s most populous counties, statistically representing the
nations 75 most populous counties, were systematically surveyed in 1996 and
2001.36 The data include identification of medical malpractice jury verdicts and

See Vidmar et al. at note 5.
See, CAROL DEFRANCES AND MARIKA LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CIVIL
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996,
available at < http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc96.htm.; Thomas Cohen , Tort
Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts, 2001 , November 2004, NCJ 206240, available at
< http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ttvlc01.htm>.
35
36
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their outcomes. The research has resulted in various reports that focus on
nationwide statistics, including jury verdicts. The raw data are archived by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research that is
headquartered at the University of Michigan. These surveys purport to provide
a comprehensive listing of all civil jury trials, including disaggregation of
medical malpractice cases in the chosen locations.37
Data supplied by John Kirkton from the Cook County Jury Verdict
Reporter indicates that, at least in 2001, the BJS survey substantially underreported the number of medical malpractice cases in Cook and DuPage
counties. BJS reported 78 jury trials whereas the verdict reporter identified 99
jury trials.38 The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data will be addressed in
the next section of this chapter. However, working on an assumption that the
Bureau of Justice’s sampling techniques were the same in both years, the BJS
data can be used to make comparisons of changes in jury verdicts between
1996 and 2001.39 They also allow us to make comparisons with nationwide
trends.

37 In our research attempting to identify more details about the cases identified in the survey
we found several cases that involved product liability claims against medical manufacturers as
well as health care providers. It was not always clear that the main defendant was the health
care provider. In at least two cases the health care provider was either dropped from the
lawsuit before trial or was found not liable. This finding raises the possibility that the BJS
statistics may slightly overstate the number of medical malpractice trials in their sample.
Another possibility is that while the Cook County Verdict Reporter includes cases in which
hospitals are the sole or primary defendant, the BJS sampling excluded such cases. Since the
BJS data do not identify plaintiffs or defendants, it is not possible to check this hypothesis
against the data.
38 There was also a $3,689,733 verdict against a chiropractic clinic (Tews v. Stoxen Chiropractic
Clinic, Docket No. 99L-12631, involving allegations of fraud, and two dental malpractice trials,
one of which resulted in an $11,250 plaintiff win and another resulting in a defense win. These
trials were eliminated from the analysis.
39 Despite proceeding with this comparison, the assumption is open to challenge. The BJS data
are purported to be comprehensive of all verdicts. The Cook County Verdict Reporter data
clearly show that in 2001 the BJS study under-reported jury verdicts by 21 percent (99 cases
in CCVR versus 78 in the BJS research). Further problems arise with the BJS data. The first
BJS survey was conducted in 1992, see DEFRANCES, C. ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (July
1996, NCJ –154346.) Although medical malpractice cases were reported for other venues in
1992 our search of the raw data discovered that medical malpractice verdicts were not
specifically distinguished from other personal injury torts in both Cook and DuPage Counties.
Despite the problems that we have identified, many researchers treat the BJS data as an

24

Changes in the Frequency of Jury Trials
Table 3.2 reports the number of medical malpractice trials in Cook and
DuPage counties over the two time periods along with adjustments for changes
in the number of treating physicians. In 1996 Cook County had 15,673 nonfederal treating physicians and in 2001 it had 16,339 treating physicians.
DuPage County had 2735 physicians in 1996 and in 2001 there were 3319
physicians.
Table 3.2: Frequency of Jury Trials by Year and in Proportion to 1000
Treating Physicians
Year

Cook County

DuPage County

1996

81

Trials/per
1000 Treating
Physicians
5

2001

78

5

Number of
Jury Trials

7

Trials/1000
Treating
Physicians
3

8

2

Number of
Jury Trials

The table shows no difference between 1996 and 2001. Note again that
the data address trials, not lawsuits or settlements arising out of those
lawsuits. As noted in Chapter 2, based on nationwide data, trials occur in less
than ten percent of all medical malpractice lawsuits. The current debate in
Illinois, however, has centered on jury trials and the effect of jury awards on
settlements. Thus, it is reasonable to ask about jury trial frequency.
The data in Table 3.2 do not reflect the possibility that more than one
physician or health care entity, such as a hospital or clinic, was named as a
defendant in the lawsuit. The data provide some insight about the complexity
of litigation and its potential effect on defendants. Table 3.3, therefore, was
constructed to show these differences. For ease of presentation the data for
Cook and DuPage counties were combined.

authoritative source and a decision was made to report comparisons between 1996 and 2001as
a separate section in this report.
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Table 3.3: Number of Defendants (and Percent of Total) Named
in Jury Trials in Cook and DuPage Counties (Combined),
By Year
Number of
Defendants
1

1996
Frequency
27 (31%)

2001
Frequency
26 (33%)

2

19 (22%)

31 (40%)

3

13 (15%)

13 (17%)

4

9 (10%)

5 (6%)

5

8 (9%)

2 (3%)

6

3 (3.%)

1 (1%)

7

3 (3%)

--

9

1 (1%)

--

10

1 (1%)

--

11

2 (2%)

--

12

1 (1%)

--

Total

87

78

Note: percentage of total trials is rounded to nearest whole number

Table 3.3 shows that approximately one third of trials involve more than
one defendant in all three time periods, but the number of trials exceeding
more than three defendants declined substantially by 2001, compared to 1996.
These changes may reflect changes in the litigation strategies as discussed in
more detail below.
Rates at Which Plaintiffs Prevailed at Trial
How often do plaintiffs prevail when a jury decides their case? In
addressing this question we again combined the data for Cook and DuPage
counties. The findings are reported in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Plaintiff Win-Rates By Year (Frequencies and Percentages)
Year

1996

2001

Plaintiff Verdicts

15 (19%)

28 (36%)

Defense Verdicts

71 (81%)

50 (64%)

Directed Verdict for
defendant
Other

1 (1 %)

0

1 (1%)

0

Total

88 (101%)

78 (100%)

Note: Percents rounded to nearest whole number

Table 3.4 shows that while the number of trials declined by 10 from 1996
to 2001, plaintiffs were more successful when they went to trial. The plaintiff’s
win rate trends are somewhat at variance with nationwide trends in plaintiff
win rates.40 In 1996 the national plaintiff win rate was 25.9% and in 2001 the
plaintiff win rate was 27.1 %. Thus, in 1996 Cook and DuPage Counties were
lower than the national average and in 2001 they were higher than the national
average.41
It is not possible to ascertain the cause of these differences in plaintiff
win rates, both over time and in comparison to nationwide data because there
are different plausible, and not necessarily exclusive, explanations. One
hypothesis is that jury attitudes toward plaintiffs and defendants changed (or
are different from state to state) but there are equally plausible competing
hypotheses. Laws may differ from state to state; laws may change over time
within states; plaintiff lawyer strategies in the cases they choose to litigate may
change; the development of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation or
arbitration may affect rates of trial; both plaintiff and defense negotiation
40 Carol DeFrances and Marika Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties,1996,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ 173426, September 1999; Thomas Cohen, Tort
Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, November
2004 NCJ 206240; Thomas Cohen, Medical Malpractice Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties ,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN , April 2004, No.NCJ 203098
41 For comparison the COOK COUNTY VERDICT REPORTER data, discussed in more detail in the
next section, shows a 2001 plaintiff win rate in Cook County and DuPage County combined
for a win rate of 30 percent. The difference between the calculated BJS plaintiff win rate and
the Cook-DuPage plaintiff win rate from the Cook County Verdict Reporter is thus about 4
percent.
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strategies may change and thus affect whether cases are settled or go to trial;
the way evidence is presented at trial may change. Posed simply, from these
data we cannot determine whether juries were deciding cases differently or
whether they were deciding different cases.42
Jury Awards in Cook and DuPage Counties: 2001
What do juries award when plaintiffs prevail? We assessed this question
by examining mean awards for Cook and DuPage Counties combined for the
year 2001.43 For these analyses we use the more comprehensive set of data
from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter supplemented by additional reports
of cases contained in databases reported in Westlaw. The mean is the
arithmetic average.
A Reminder About Jury Verdicts
Before this analysis is presented several caveats that were discussed in
Chapter 2 need to be repeated. First, jury verdicts are not necessarily the
amount that the plaintiff actually receives. In some cases the judge may reduce
that amount in entering judgment. In other cases the parties may enter into a
high-low agreement prior to the verdict. Often, cases with high-low agreements
are not disputes about the health provider’s liability but rather about the
amount of the damages. In other instances high-low agreements may reflect
the fact that the two sides recognize that the issue of liability is about a fiftyfifty probability and both become risk-averse. As a consequence, they enter into
a mutual agreement that prevents an extreme outcome, such as the plaintiff

42 See Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury
Behavior and the Tort System. 27 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1205 (1994/1996).
43 The trials include medical malpractice lawsuits against medical doctors defined as having
MD degrees and hospitals and their employees. Malpractice lawsuits against dentists,
podiatrists chiropractors, physical therapists, pharmacies and nursing homes or other
healthcare providers that did not include MDs or hospitals as defendants are not included in
this research. A few cases classified as medical malpractice were actually slip and fall or
contract disputes and were eliminated from consideration.
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receiving nothing or the defendant being faced with a catastrophic damage
award.44
Plaintiffs may settle for the limits of the defendant’s medical liability
insurance coverage rather than press for the full judgment.45 In other cases
the plaintiff may agree to settle for less than the judgment to avoid the
defendant’s appeal of the verdict, possibly losing everything if the judgment is
overturned, but in any event suffering a long delay in receiving any money
through the long delays as the case winds its way through the appeals courts.
Additionally, an appeals court may overturn the verdict and the judgment or
the amount of damages may be reduced.
A final reminder is that a plaintiff who loses at trial against one or more
defendants may still receive substantial sums of money from other defendants
in the lawsuit who settled prior to trial. The jury will not be aware of these
agreements when they render their verdict. In some instances in which the
plaintiff does prevail at trial, the amounts of prior settlements by other
defendants will be deducted from the judgment, a deduction called a “set-off.”
The case summaries, reported below, find examples of these various settlement
outcomes.
The final caution is that these data do not tell us if the jury verdict was
correct on either the issue of liability or the amount of damages. There is no
absolute truth about right or wrong. Cases come to trial because there is a
dispute about either liability or damages or both. Under the law the resolution
of the dispute is left to the jury and the trial judge who enters the judgment. In
appealed cases, appellate courts review whether the decisions of the judge and
jury were correct. They may overturn verdicts or awards.
The central lesson to keep in mind is that jury verdicts can be less or can
be more than what is reported in the newspapers and portrayed by the parties
on both sides of the dispute about tort reform. This chapter will report not only
Importantly, the jury and, most likely the judge, will be totally unaware of this high-low
agreement.
45 See, Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35
LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, 275, 284-85 (2001).
44
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damage verdicts but separately report some of these “hidden” outcomes. The
year 2001 was chosen for detailed study for several reasons. It is the year
studied by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The year 2001 is a year when the
problem with medical malpractice insurance began to be publicly recognized.
Most important, the three-to-four-year time gap between 2001 and 2005 allows
time for post-verdict settlements and for contested verdicts to be scrutinized by
appellate courts, permitting insight into final outcomes of jury trials.
Plaintiff Verdicts and Adjustments in 2001
The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data indicate there were a total of
99 medical malpractice jury trials in Cook and DuPage counties in 2001.46
Plaintiffs prevailed in 30 of these cases, a 30 percent win rate.47 Table 3.5
reports the name of the case, a short description of the plaintiff’s claim, the
amount of the verdict, and any post-trial adjustments to the verdict. The
footnotes in the table report the nature of the adjustment, but each of these
cases is subsequently discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow.

46 Again note that these data are more comprehensive than the Bureau of Justice Statistics
data discussed in the previous section.
47 In a small number of cases the jury was deadlocked. Deadlocked juries are treated as a
defense win since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The plaintiff has a right to have the
case retried.
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Table 3.5: Plaintiff Verdicts and Adjustments in Cook and DuPage Counties, 2001
Case
Bryant v. LaGrange Memorial Hospital ,
Kim & others
Lawler v. Lamont
Brewster v. West & two others
Aceves v. Orihuela
E. Munoz v. Clemis & others
D. Munoz v. Herman & others
McNamara v. Grimaldi
Matthews v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital
Genovese v. Caro
Willis v. Bracket & others
Bales v. Groya & others
Washington v. Wilczynski & others
Gonzales v. Pla

Claim
Birth injury-cerebral palsy

$30,000,000 $1,100,000

a

Delayed cancer diagnosis
Foot fracture misdiagnosed :
subsequent surgery
Bile duct cut-reconstructive surgery
Delayed cancer diagnosis: larynx
surgery; chemotherapy
Mis-diagnosis: testicle removed
Informed consent re vasectomy: pain
and suffering
Stillborn birth

$3,800,000 $3,800,000

b

Cornea puncture: subsequent surgery
Hip surgery: corrective surgery
Misdiagnosis: leg amputation
Diagnosis delay: loss of testicle
Undiagnosed kidney disease requires
transplant
Other patient's blood thinner given:
Death

Waliczek v. Gutta
Stajsczyk v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital &
others
Jugular vein puncture: death
Thomas v. Hosain & others
Antibiotic delay: death
Matei v. Patel & others
Premature discharge: infant dies
Birth injury: nerve damage (Erb's
Skonieczny v. Gardner & others
palsy)
Misdiagnosis brain disease: pain and
suffering
Christy v. Cavanaugh
Improper management of injury: child
Cork v. Cook County Hospital
dies
Tracheal tube damage to child burn
victim
Simpson v. Allswede & others
Cummings v. Suprenant & others
Excessive radiation: severe burns
Salas v. Michael Reese Hospital
& others
Unnecessary surgery: death of toddler
Guerin v. Yu & others
Death of mother following C-section
Surgery & misdiagnosis: amputation
below elbow
Banis v. Loyola U Hospital& others
Perrier v. Feinstein & others
Penile implant infection
Gonzalez v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. &
Misdiagnosis of stroke: death
others
Prostatectomy & rectum puncture:
eventual death
Schlindler v. Lipshitz
Macias v. St. Anthony Hosp
Carroll v. Barrows & others

Amount of Award after
Adjustment
Award

Absence of lab work: baby later dies
Misdiagnosed eye cancer; toddler
blind both eyes
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$170,000
$467,900

$170,000
$467,900

$2,495,893 $2,495,893
$150,000
$0 c
$317,000
$317,000
$3,781,393 $3,781,393
$494,906
$120,608
$2,812,553
$200,000

$494,906
$120,608
$2,812,553
$200,000

$1,191,256 $950,000

d

$6,500,000 $800,000

e

$801,643
$835,000
$525,000

$801,643
$835,000
$525,000

$13,298,052 $2,000,000

f

$2,500,000 $2,500,000
$5,300,000 $0

g

$2,563,492 $1,900,000
$1,250,000 $1,250,000
$2,750,000 $2,750,000
$7,622,040 $7,000,000

h

i

$1,710,000 $1,710,000
$218,626
$218,626
$1,250,000 $1,255,000

j

$1, 262,748 $1, 262,748
$1,500,000 $1,400,000
$7,962, 024 $2,000,000

k

Notes: a: Loyola dismissed after settling for $100,000 before trial; plaintiff accepted Kim offer of policy limits
during jury deliberations. b: Appealed, judgment affirmed. c: Two defendants settled before trial; setoff leaves
on $4,000 judgment for costs. d: High-low ($150,000-$950,000); e. High-low ($350,000-$800,000 during jury
deliberations. f. High-low agreement before verdict for policy limits of $1million for two defendants. g.
Reversed on appeal; remanded for new trial. h: Post-trial settlement. i: High-low agreement ($500,000$7,000,000) during deliberations. j: Case settled post-trial. k: Case settled for policy
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From the data in Table 3.5 a quick calculation will indicate that the
mean (average) verdict was $3,461,671. However, the last column in the table
shows that at least seven of the verdicts were adjusted downward. The mean
adjusted verdict when plaintiffs prevailed at trial was substantially lower,
namely $1,465, 609, forty-two percent lower than the unadjusted figure.
The downward adjustment is very likely a conservative figure since posttrial settlements of awards may occur after the verdict reporter summaries are
published. Additionally some settlements are kept confidential as a condition of
settlement. Nevertheless, the central finding from Table 3.5 confirms a view
that the amount that the jury awards the plaintiff is frequently not the end of
the story. The amount actually paid may be substantially less.
Further Exploration of the 2001 Plaintiff Awards Involving $1 Million or
Over
Table 3.5 does not give much detail about the case and its outcome. In
this section short summaries of the cases over $1 million are presented. The
summaries are from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, supplemented by
research on Westlaw and Findlaw databases and calls to lawyers who
represented parties in the case.48 Note again that the summaries do not allow
an assessment of whether the jury verdict was correct or incorrect by some
absolute standard as to either negligence or the amount of damages. In some
instances the defense or plaintiff position regarding the claim is missing from
the summaries. Some of the cases may still be on appeal and in others the case
may have settled in the aftermath of the verdict. Nevertheless, the summaries
provide a perspective on what was at issue in the case.

48 In the footnotes below I report the court’s docket number and beginning date of trial taken
from the data supplied by the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter. Unless otherwise noted the
summary is taken from that source. In some instances the summary is supplemented from
another source and this is noted as appropriate. In appealed cases the docket number of the
appellate court is provided.
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Bryant v. La Grange Memorial Hospital, Kim, Nath and Loyola University
Hospital49 involved a claim that in 1995 Dr. Kim was negligent in delaying a
Caesarian section following signs of distress in the infant and that hospital
employees also were negligent. The child suffered severe cerebral palsy and
cannot walk or talk and is totally dependent but cognitively intact. The jury
deliberated 7 hours and found only against Dr. Kim for $30 million. ($15
million disability; $4 million pain and suffering; $4 million disfigurement; $5.5
million for future medical expenses; $1.4 million for lost earnings and
$116,700 for past medical expenses. Loyola University hospital and its
employee, Dr. Nath, settled for $100,000 prior to trial and the plaintiff accepted
Dr. Kim’s offer of his $1 million policy limit during the jury’s seven hours of
deliberations. The plaintiff subsequently appealed the verdict in favor of
LaGrange Memorial Hospital but a unanimous opinion of the Third Division
Appeals Court affirmed the verdict favoring LaGrange.50
Lawler v. Lomont 51 involved a 1997 hysterectomy for cancer following a
pathologist who misread Pap smears from 1994 through 1996, allowing stage 1
cancer to spread. The defense admitted liability but contested the likelihood of
cancer reoccurrence and argued that the plaintiff had infertility problems
before the surgery. The DuPage jury award of $3,800,000 ($2.5 million pain
and suffering; $1.2 million loss of a normal life; $100,000 disfigurement) was
appealed by the defendant, but the appellate court upheld the award.52 The
case settled for the full amount of the verdict.53
Munoz v Clemis, Garcelon and Health Care Service Corp 54 involved a 40year-old woman who claimed that her HMO physician and a second physician
failed to perform a timely biopsy following complaints of hoarseness. Due to
delays the plaintiff lost confidence in her doctors and sought a new physician.
The new physician diagnosed throat cancer. The plaintiff underwent surgery
49
50
51
52
53
54

96L-11679 (Tried July 16, 2001).
Findlaw, Third Division, Illinois Court of Appeals, No.1-02-0518 (Dec 17,2003).
99L-555 (Tried June 11, 2001)
Ill. App. Ct., 2nd District, No. 2-01-1307
Telephone call to plaintiff lawyer on May 5, 2005.
2001 WL 34554111; JVR no. 412, 296.
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that removed three-fourths of her voice box and required a tracheostomy. The
jury returned a verdict of $2,495, 893 against all defendants , broken down as
follows: $335,000 aggravation of pre-existing ailment or condition; $500,000
disfigurement resulting from the injury: $500,000 past and future disability:
$1,000,000 past and future pain and suffering; $108,593 medicals; and
$52,300 lost wages. The HMO was found liable under a claim of vicarious
liability. (Prior to trial the plaintiff demanded $3,200,000 and the defense
offered $41,000.) (The specialist physician to whom the plaintiff was referred
by her primary physician was not mentioned in the trial summary and may
have settled separately with the plaintiff prior to trial, but no further
information could be obtained.)
Matthews v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital

55

involved the estate of a stillborn

girl at 42 weeks gestation. The hospital admitted liability and the trial involved
only the matter of damages for the parent’s “loss of society.” Reportedly, a
judge recommended a settlement of $600,000 to $700,000 and counsel agreed
but the parents refused preferring to have a jury decide the case. The jury
awarded $3,781,392 ($1,875,000 for each parent’s loss of society plus $31,393
for funeral and medical expenses). The defendant appealed the verdict, but the
three-judge appeals court unanimously affirmed the verdict.56 Among other
rulings, the appeals court ruled that the trial judge properly barred certain
evidence because during discovery the defendant failed to disclose evidence
requested by the plaintiff and ruled against a defense complaint about
improper comments by the plaintiff’s lawyer in closing arguments because the
defense did not object in a timely manner. The court further rejected a defense
argument that the trial judge inappropriately admitted certain medical
expenses.

55
56

97L-12643 (Tried June 12, 2001)
Appellate Division, 1st District, 4th Division No.1-02-0853, 6 ARD 36.
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Bales v. Groya, and Community Orthopedics

57concerned

a 33-year-old-

roofer who was injured in a fall and fractured his right lower leg. Surgery was
performed but plaintiff claimed that a subsequent infection was improperly
treated and the plaintiff was never hospitalized. A second surgery by another
physician amputated the leg below the knee. The defense claimed the plaintiff
had refused hospitalization after the infection developed. The jury awarded $2,
812,553 ($750,000 for disfigurement, $100,000 for past loss of normal life;
$350,000 for past pain and suffering; $150,000 for future pain and suffering;
$200,000 for future medical expenses, $52,553 for past medicals and
$500,000 for future lost lifetime earnings.)
Gonzales v. Pla

58

involved a claim that a primary care physician’s failure

to diagnose kidney disease resulted in a 43-year-old male requiring a kidney
transplant. The defendant argued at trial that his care was proper and that in
any event the plaintiff would have required a kidney transplant and further
that the plaintiff did not make a return visit to his office as instructed. The jury
returned a verdict of $1,191,256 for the plaintiff. However, during jury
deliberations the parties made a high-low agreement ($150,000-$950,000) on
the doctor’s $1 million liability policy. Thus the plaintiff received $950,000.
Waliczek v. Ghandhigutta and Alexian Brothers Medical Center59 involved
the death of a 47-year-old construction worker who was hospitalized following
a construction accident. The man had multiple fractures in his arms, wrists
and legs, bleeding in the stomach and a small amount of bleeding in the brain.
The plaintiff’s estate contended that the man was administered the blood
thinning agent heparin intended for another patient. The defendants disputed
both negligence and causation. On June 28, 2001 the jury rendered a verdict of
$6,500,000. However, while the jury was deliberating the parties entered into a
high-low agreement of $350,000-$800,000.

97L-12643 (Tried June 12, 2001)
97L-9163 (Tried January 11, 2001).
59 2001 WL 34004686; ZARIN'S MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT, Vol. 10, Issue 2. 97L-8110 (Tried June
15, 2001)
57
58

36

Skonieczny v. Gardner, Northwest Professional Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Levy and Northwest Community Hospital

60

concerned a claim that a brachial

plexus injury during delivery resulted in permanent loss of the use of the
child’s left arm and shoulder plus the likelihood of future arthritis and pain.
The plaintiff claimed that the obstetrician applied excessive traction to the
baby’s head and that hospital nurses inappropriately pushed down on the
mother’s stomach during delivery. The jury awarded $13, 298,052, but
defendant Levy was found not liable. Defendants Gardner and Northwest
Professional entered into a high-low agreement of $1 million to $2 million with
the plaintiff before the verdict. Each defendant had a $1 million policy limit.
Christy v. Cavanaugh

61

involved a claim brought by the family of a man

who died in 1997 from complications associated with Huntington’s Chorea, an
incurable disease of the nervous system. The family contended that for seven
years a psychiatrist had misdiagnosed the symptoms as due to depression,
therefore preventing treatment that would have abated the man’s symptoms
and mitigated the pain and suffering by the man and his family. They
contended that the worsening symptoms should have resulted in a referral to a
neurologist who would have conducted proper testing. The defendant denied
negligence and contended that the physical manifestations typically associated
with this rare disease were not noticeable in the patient. In May 2001 the jury
awarded $2,500,000.
Cork v. Cook County Hospital62 concerned a 12-year-old female who was
admitted to the hospital in 1991 with a severe windpipe injury following a
suicide attempt. She was discharged in stable condition but subsequently
readmitted. The lawsuit claimed that upon readmission following breathing
difficulties, inexperienced hospital personnel attempted to intubate her at
bedside rather than in an operating room. As a result, it was claimed, she was
deprived of oxygen, suffered irreversible brain damage and died four days later.
98L-4578 (Tried May 7, 2001).
2001 WL 1855179; ZARIN'S MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT, Vol. 10, Issue 6. 98L-4578 (Tried May 7,
2001).
62 99L-14351 (Tried May 2, 2001).
60
61
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The defense claimed the child died from pneumonia and other symptoms. A
favorable plaintiff verdict was overturned. This was the second trial and the
jury rendered an award of $5,300,000. However, on appeal in 2003 the First
District Appellate Court, Fourth Division, again reversed and remanded the
case for a third trial. A rehearing was denied in 2004.63
Simpson v. Allswede and Midwest Emergency Services, Ltd. 64 involved a
claim that an emergency room physician used a wrong sized tube to intubate
an eight- year-boy who was admitted with severe burns to his face and torso
following explosion of an aerosol can. The plaintiff also claimed that the
intubation was unnecessary because, despite the burns, there was no
indication of difficulty in breathing or hoarseness. The tube remained in place
for approximately a week. Ultimately the boy had to undergo a tracheostomy
that remained in place for five years plus undergo three additional surgical
resections. As a teenager the boy had made a good recovery and could speak
normally and breathe easily. On May 8, 2001 the jury returned a verdict of
$2, 563,492 ($1.1 million for pain and suffering; $550,000 disfigurement;
$650,000 for loss of a normal life; $263,492 for medical expenses). The case is
reported elsewhere as settled post-verdict for $1,900,000.65
Cummings v. Suprenant, Midwestern University, and Olympia Fields
Osteopathic Hospital

66

asserted that the plaintiff suffered excessive burns on

his back from a fluoroscopy plus an increased risk of getting cancer. The
defendant cardiologist contended that proper consent was obtained, that the
exposure was limited, the radiation was in the appropriate amount and that
the plaintiff was possibly unusually susceptible to radiation. The jury returned
a verdict against the doctor for $1,250,000 ($500,000 medical expenses;
$500,000 pain and suffering; $250,000 for disfigurement: $0 for disability). The
63 Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division , No. 1-02-1009 (December 11,
2003); Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division No. 1-02 1009 ( February 26,
2004).
64 2001 WL 1855179; 10 ZARIN’S MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT 6:34 . 96-4608 consolidated with
96L-4770 ( Tried April 30, 2001).
65 Westlaw WL 34395032, JVR No. 409, 786.
66 97L-7658 (Tried March 27, 2001).
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hospital was dismissed mid-trial in a $75,000 settlement that was set off
against the verdict.
Salas v. Columbia Michael Reese Hospital, Organ, Podorovsky, Carranza
and Leland

67

involved a wrongful death claim involving a two-year-old girl. The

girl was developmentally delayed, had congenital heart disease and
chromosomal defects. In January 1997, she developed respiratory distress and
was admitted to Michael Reese Hospital because X-rays showed a collapsed left
lung; she could not breathe without supplemental oxygen. A CT scan of poor
quality suggested a tumor but a second scan was negative. The plaintiff’s
family claimed that surgery was a high risk because of the collapsed lung and
pneumonia. They also claimed there was no informed consent for the
procedure because the mother only signed consent for a 'mini-thoracotomy,'
while the doctor performed a standard thoracotomy. Also, plaintiff claimed
that the anesthesiologist, should have used singular lung ventilation to protect
against secretions. The defense claimed surgery was necessary even if the CT
scan was negative because the source of the compression needed to be
diagnosed and that single lung ventilation was impractical on a 2-year-old.
Following a fifteen-day trial the jury awarded $2,750,000 for wrongful death
against Michael Reese hospital, Organ and Podorovsky. Carranza was found
not liable and Leland received a directed verdict. The plaintiff had asked the
jury for $15 million. Post-trial motions were filed in this case but no additional
information was available.
Guerin v. Yu and Rush Prudential HMO

68is

a case in which a mother

gave birth by Caesarian section. The mother was discharged from the hospital
but a post-partum examination showed excess bleeding. It was alleged that the
defendant was negligent in failing to test the level of hemoglobin. She
eventually was rushed to a hospital and underwent four surgeries to stop the
bleeding but then developed Adult Respiratory Syndrome and died, survived by
her husband and newborn child. The defense argued that the doctor’s actions
67
68

2001 WL 34030899; NATIONAL VERDICT REPORTER. 97L-1732 ( Tried Feb 20, 2001).
96L-15058 ( Tried March 19, 2001).

39

were not the proximate cause of death. The jury awarded $7,622,040 against
both defendants for survival pain and suffering ($1 million), medical and
funeral expenses ($92,940), funeral expenses ($4,100), lifetime earnings
($750,000) loss of household services ($275,000) loss of society to husband
($2.5 million) and loss of society for newborn child ($2.5 million). During
deliberations the parties entered into a high-low agreement ($500,000-$7
million).
Banis v. Loyola University Hospital and Dobozi

69

involved a claim from a

patient admitted to the hospital in a coma with several fractures, pulmonary
contusion and a brain injury following an automobile accident . The plaintiff
asserted that hospital staff did not check his forearm, which developed
compartment syndrome and turned necrotic. All of the patient’s left forearm
muscles had to be removed and all subsequent physicians had recommended
amputating the arm below the elbow. The defense argued that the
compartment syndrome is an extremely rare complication in such cases and
that the defendant’s comatose state made diagnosis of compartment syndrome
difficult. The jury awarded $1,700,000 against both defendants for disability
($570,000), disfigurement ($570,000) and pain and suffering (570,000). The
case settled for the amount of the verdict.70
Gonzalez v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital, Gonzalez, and Joshi

71

involved

a male patient, age 61, admitted to the hospital with symptoms consistent
with a transient ischemic attack or stroke. Following treatment and tests the
man died. The plaintiff’s estate contended that the treatment deviated from the
standard of care by administering a blood thinner and not conducting
sufficient tests to determine if hemmoraging might be taking place. The
hospital admitted that it failed to communicate the results of tests but denied
negligence, liability or the proximate cause of the man’s death.The physician’s
denied a duty to contact the hospital for lab results and asserted that it was
69
70
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97L-3408 ( Tried March 2, 2001)
Telephone call to plaintiff lawyer on May 5, 2005.
96L-14398 (Tried January 30, 2001).
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reasonable to rely on the protocol of the hospital and its nursing staff. The jury
found the two doctors not liable but awarded $1,250,000 against the hospital:
$1,250,000 for loss of society , but nothing for pain and suffering and
disability. The case settled for $1, 255,000.
Schlindler v. Lipshitz

72

involved a prostatectomy on a man, age 71 in

1995. During the procedure the man’s rectum was perforated. The error was
immediately recognized and repaired. The patient was discharged without
further tests. The man returned to the doctor’s office reporting that his stool
was leaking into the incision. The doctor noted the man probably had a
developing fistula and sent him home with instructions to take sitz baths and
change back to a soft diet. At trial a plaintiff’s surgeon said that the man
should have had a colostomy at that time. A colostomy was eventually
performed and then reversed. However, the fistula reopened and the man died
from complications. The defendant doctor asserted that all decisions that were
made were judgment calls and within the standard of care. Further, the
defendant contended that the decision to reverse the colostomy was solely that
of the surgeon who performed it and the decision was the sole proximate cause
of the subsequent injuries and death. The defense made a high-low offer
during jury deliberations of $15,000-$1,000,000 during jury deliberations (the
summary is unclear as to whether the offer was accepted). The jury returned a
verdict of $1, 262, 748 ( $600,000 for wrongful death , $462,748 for medical
expenses; and $200,000 for survival pain).
Macias v. St. Anthony’s Hospital

73

involved a child born in 1995. Blood

samples were drawn as required by the Illinois Department of Public Health.
The newborn child was not feeding well and developed jaundice. She was
admitted to another hospital , transferred to the University of Chicago Hospital
where she died. At trial the evidence indicated that the blood samples were not
received by the Illinois Department of Health lab until 13 days after they were
drawn. The results indicated that the baby had a congenital metabolic defect
72
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97L4830 (Tried February 2, 2001).
97L-6675 (Tried January 30, 2001).
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that , if detected, could have saved her life. The hospital argued that the
samples were sent on a timely basis and that the child died from an unrelated
influenza infection ( an opinion supported by the treating physician). The jury
awarded $1,500,000 ($1 million for survival pain and suffering, $42,705 for
medical expenses and $457, 295 for loss of society). The case was subsequently
settled for $1,400,000.
Carroll v. Barrows, Barrows and Brown

74

was a lawsuit claiming that the

defendants failed to properly diagnose abnormalities in the eyes of a child
during seven visits during his first year of life. When the child was seen by the
physician’s partner the abnormalities were detected and the child was referred
to a specialist who detected signs of cancer. The child subsequently had
radiation and chemotherapy treatments but eventually lost both eyes. The
plaintiff’s experts testified that if the child’s condition had been diagnosed
earlier there was a greater than fifty percent chance that vision could have
been saved. The defense maintained that a pediatrician could miss the
diagnosis if a portion of the eye was normal, that the patient’s form of cancer
could not have been treated in any event and that an earlier diagnosis would
not have changed the outcome. The jury awarded $7,962,024 against both
defendants (1 million for disfigurement; $3.5 million for disability; 1 million for
pain and suffering , $152, 224 for medical expenses and $2, 309,800 for
lifetime earnings). The case settled for the $2 million policy limits of the
defendants.75
Selected Defense Verdicts Involving Payments to Plaintiffs
In Chapter 2 attention was drawn to the fact that even when plaintiffs
lose against some defendants at trial they may nevertheless recover money
from other defendants. Of the 72 defense verdicts there are some examples to
illustrate this fact.
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96L-13562 (Tried January 17, 2001).
Confirmed by a phone message from the plaintiff’s lawyer to Vidmar on April 28, 2005
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Foley v. Lutheran General Hospital

76

involved a third trial in a case in a

wrongful death lawsuit. The other two trials involved deadlocked juries in
which a majority of jurors (11:1 in the first trial and 9:3 in the second trial)
favored the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s estate claimed that in 1993 her bowel was
perforated during a tubal ligation and she subsequently became physically
distressed and died from sepsis. Although the hospital’s policy was that their
laboratory call a panic button when lab results showed a panic situation, the
log book that would document a panic call was missing. The defense argued
that the most likely cause of death was a pulmonary embolism. The plaintiff
was survived by her husband and two daughters, ages 4 and 7months. The
jury sided with the defense in this third trial. However, the parties entered into
a high-low agreement during deliberations of $1 million versus $5 million. The
plaintiff’s estate thus received $1,000,000 from the hospital and $900,000 from
another original defendant who settled with the estate before trial.
Marcial v. Michael and St. Anthony’s Hospital

77

involved a wrongful death

claim from the estate of a 65-year old female who fell down stairs and was
admitted to the hospital. The plaintiff’s estate asserted that the treating
physician made a misdiagnosis of a pulmonary embolism and administered the
blood thinner Heparin.The patient developed sepsis and died after
approximately four weeks. The defense argued that the diagnosis was proper as
was the treatment. Although the jury sided with the defendants, the parties
had a high-low agreement of $50,000 -$1 million. The woman’s estate received
$50,000 from the defendant plus a pretrial settlement with the hospital for
$30,000.
Jones v. Jordan

78

involved a claim that the defendant was negligent in

failing to diagnose meningitis in an 86 day-old child resulting in quadraplegia
and severe mental retardation ( an IQ of about 30). The plaintiff claimed that
the doctor recommended giving the child castor oil rather than examine the
76
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95L-5339 (Tried January 5, 2001).
96L-50363 (Tried March 14, 2001).
96L-13425 (Tried September 10, 2001).
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child. Two persons corroborated the mother’s version of events. The doctor
denied that he recommended castor oil for a child under two and that even if a
phone call of some kind had taken place the standard of care would not require
that the child be seen immediately. The jury sided with the defense. In earlier
proceedings the HMO that employed the treating doctor was dismissed from
the lawsuit by the judge, but the summary judgment was reversed by the
Illinois Appellate Court with an order for a new trial. Prior to the trial the HMO
settled with the defendant for $1,700,000.
Gamboa v. Christ Hospital and Sternquist

79

was a lawsuit alleging that a

premature baby fell out of an isolet in the intermediate care nursery and
suffered a skull fracture. The child now has cognitive, speech and language
deficits. The defense argued that its nurse complied with the standard of care,
that the child suffered only superficial bleeding from the fall, and that the
deficits were associated with his prematurity. The jury supported the claims of
the defendants. Just before the jury rendered its verdict the parties entered
into a high-low agreement of $1 million versus $3 million, resulting in the
plaintiff receiving $1 million.
Thomas v. Habid and University of Chicago Hospital

80

was filed after a

patient presented to the treating physician with a distended stomach and was
treated for megacolon with several medications in 1994. The patient improved,
but in 1995 was hospitalized with respiratory distress and other symptoms and
was later found dead in the hospital’s commode. His estate claimed the cause
of death was respiratory failure caused by pressure on his diaphragm and
lungs from a megacolon. The defense countered that the patient died of an
unrelated cardiac problem. The defendant physician was found not liable.
However, the hospital was dismissed from the lawsuit after it settled for $1
million at the start of trial.
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96L- 2442 (Tried September 17, 2001).
96L-6604 (Tried August 20, 2001).
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Allen v. Kirby and Harvey & Associates

81

involved a malpractice claim by

a lawyer who alleged that he became blind after negligent treatment. In 1995
she entered the emergency room of Columbus Hospital with complaints of
severe headache and blurry vision. She was diagnosed with sinusitis, her
personal physician was contacted and the physician prescribed an antibiotic
and Tylenol #3 by phone. The patient became worse, the doctor advised her to
discontinue the Tylenol and make an office visit the next day. Instead the
patient went two days later to the emergency room at Nowrthwestern Memorial
Hospital and was diagnosed with a blood clot that resulted in strangulation of
the optic nerves. Plaintiff is now totally blind and needs a seeing eye dog. The
physicians who subsequently treated the patient and other experts testified
that had she been diagnosed earlier, vision would have been saved. The jury
found both defendants not liable, but there was a high-low agreement of
$200,000 - $1,950,000 and thus the plaintiff received $200,000.
Brandonisio v. Kahan and Ob-Gyne Specialists

82involved

a case in which

an iliac artery was cut during a laproscopy. When bleeding occurred, open
surgery was conducted to repair the injury. The plaintiff claimed ongoing
numbness and weakness in her left leg as a result of the surgery. The defense
argued that the injury was immediately recognized and they took proper
corrective action. Although the jury sided with the defendants, a high-low
agreement of $200,000-$1 million just prior to closing arguments resulted in a
payment of $200,000.
Hanson v. Kanuri and Hinsdale Anesthesia Associates

83

concerned a

claim that an anesthesiologist failed to take proper cautions involving a 63year–old man who had recently been taking Coumadin, a blood thinner prior to
undergoing surgery on his spine. The man died. The defendant anesthesiologist
contended that the surgeon was responsible because he had cleared the
patient for surgery and in addition had failed to alert him of the need to
81
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terminate the anesthesia sooner because of excessive bleeding. The DuPage
County jury found for the defendants. However, while the jury was deliberating,
the parties reached a high-low agreement of $1 million versus $3 million,
subject to a setoff for a pretrial settlement by Hinsdale Hospital. In short the
plaintiff received $1 million despite losing at trial.
Goodman v. University of Illinois Hospital

84

is a case that ended in a

hung jury with nine of the twelve jurors favoring the defendant. A baby born
with a congenital heart defect underwent corrective surgery in 1995, but a
subsequent infection developed and he died in 1996. The defense argued that
the surgical treatment was appropriate. During the jury selection for a second
trial the case settled for $600,000.
Fleming v. Murphy

85

Involved a plaintiff who was admitted to Northwest

Community Hospital for repair of an abdominal aortic aneurysm. Following the
surgery the man became paraplegic, dependent on a wheelchair and leg braces.
The defendant surgeon asserted that he met the standard of care and said that
the paralysis is a known, though rare, complication of the surgery. The jury
was deadlocked 10 to 2 and the case subsequently settled for $300,000.
Several other defense verdicts against doctors had pre- or mid-trial
settlements of $25,000 by hospitals that had been named as co-defendants.
In Egenou v. Elahi and Weiss Memorial Hospital

86

the jury rendered a

defense verdict in a case involving a claim that intubation left a woman in a
vegetative state. The judge ordered a new trial. No other information about the
case could be found.
A Multi-Million Dollar Settlement in 2001
In addition to the above jury verdicts, there was a multi-million dollar
settlement in 2001 that was reported for Cook County. Settlements are
important because they reflect upon the costs incurred by medical providers
84
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and their insurers. The case is probably an exceptional case, but it gives a
glimpse of the less visible side of medical malpractice litigation in Illinois.
American National Bank and Trust v. Advocate Health and Hospitals,
Corp.87 involved a settlement of $12,000,000 following the birth of triplets in
1993. Two of the children were born with spastic cerebral palsy and brain
damage; the third child, also suffering with cerebral palsy and brain damage,
died in 1997. Of the $12 million total, $5.5 million was awarded for one child,
$3 million for the second child, $2 million to the estate of the third child for
wrongful death and $1.5 million to the parents of the children under the
Family Expense Act. The claim was based on the assertion that the health care
providers were negligent in not informing the parents of the risks of triplet
pregnancies, failing to examine the mother on a timely basis when premature
labor began and failure to provide appropriate medicines on a timely basis after
delivery by Caesarian section. Lutheran General Hospital was self-insured and
paid $2 million while St. Paul Insurance Company paid $10 million for the
other two defendants.
Cook and DuPage Jury Verdicts: 2002-2004
I also obtained data on jury verdicts in Cook and DuPage counties for
2002, 2003 and 2004. The problem with these data for this report is that postverdict adjustments often take many months and are often not available in
initial verdict reports. As demonstrated with the 2001 data, without these
adjustments the verdicts can be quite misleading. As a consequence, I report
only the frequency of jury trials and plaintiff win rates for the combined
counties.
Table 3.6 reports the frequency of jury trials and plaintiff win rates for
Cook and DuPage counties for 2001 through 2004.
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2001 WL 34030866, 96L-05765 ( 2001).
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Table 3.6: Jury Trial Frequency and Plaintiff Win Rates
in Cook and DuPage Counties (Combined): 2001-2004
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004

Trial
99
110
99
97

Win rate
30%
37%
36%
30%

The table shows that in 2002 trial frequency changed from 99 trials in
2001 to 110 trials, an increase of 10 percent. The table also indicates that the
plaintiff win rate jumped 7%. However, in 2003 frequency of trials returned to
99 although plaintiffs win rate was 36%. In 2004 there were two fewer trials
than in 2001 and the win rate returned to 30%. In short, there is no evidence
of increasing jury trials or increased win rates over the four-year period.
Remember also that the trials in all of these years were based on lawsuits that
on average were filed between three and six years earlier than the trial date.
Summary and Conclusion
The statistics and case summaries presented in this section are
compilations and case summaries collected by others and checked, where
possible, against other sources. The summaries of the issues in the case may
contain details or omissions that parties to the actual cases may contest.
Nevertheless, the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data appear to be generally
accurate. With the one exception of National Bank and Trust, they speak only to
outcomes of jury trials, which may constitute only ten percent or fewer of all
malpractice claims during 2001 since the overwhelming majority of claims are
settled without jury trials.88
But since Cook and DuPage counties contain approximately one half of
the population of Illinois and approximately two-thirds of its non-federal
treating physicians and much of the debate about problems with the tort
See Vidmar et al, Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights
from Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315(2005); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY (1995) at pages 24-25.
88
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system focus on jury decisions, some important findings emerge from the
analyses. There was a modest increase in medical malpractice case filings
between 1996 and 2004, but when adjusted for the growth in physicians who
treat patients there is no evidence of a medical malpractice claims increase.
The data from the federal Bureau of Statistics study raise questions about
comprehensiveness but they do show no increase in jury trials between 1996
and 2001.
Jury verdict reports from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter appear
to be a comprehensive survey and provide more details about jury trials than
other sources. These data show no increases in jury trials or in plaintiff win
rates between 2001 and 2004.
Trial outcomes are a matter of judgment. The claims in many of the trials
that are summarized involve very serious injuries or death. Trials occur when
the plaintiff and the defendants cannot agree on legal liability or the amount of
damages. Different readers could undoubtedly draw different opinions about
the verdicts if they heard the same evidence that the jury heard.
What we can draw from the findings is that in cases where plaintiffs
prevailed, twelve citizens of the State of Illinois, some who voted Republican
and some who voted Democrat, heard the evidence and unanimously agreed on
a verdict. In the vast majority of the cases a trial judge agreed with the verdict
and entered judgment. We can also draw a conclusion that the judgment was
not always the final word. Sometimes a trial judge or an appellate court
overturned the verdict. In other instances the parties settled for much less than
the verdict. Some very large verdicts actually settled for the limits of the
insurance coverage. In other instances the parties entered into high-low
agreements before the verdict. Although the final settlements of some cases
could not be determined, the post trial adjustments that were available indicate
that the mean adjusted verdict was much less than the original verdict—in one
instance, from $30 million to $2 million. The data also show that some
plaintiffs who lost at trial against one or more defendants still ended up with
large settlements from other defendants.
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The findings from Cook and DuPage counties account for high
percentages of Illinois’ population and Illinois doctors. Can they be generalized
to the rest of the state, especially if, as some have claimed, there are “judicial
hellholes” in certain smaller Illinois counties? Chapter 4 turns to an
examination of Madison and St. Clair counties.
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Chapter 4
A Close Look at Madison and St. Clair Counties and the Southern District
of Illinois Federal Court
Madison and St. Clair counties have been a center of controversy in the
debate about medical malpractice and doctors’ liability insurance premiums.
When President Bush visited Collinsville in January 2005, he blamed the
problem on outsized jury awards. News reports suggest that doctors have left
the area because of high malpractice insurance premiums, blaming the
problem on jury awards. The American Tort Reform Association has labeled
Madison County as a “judicial hellhole.” Much of the controversy involves large
awards in class action asbestos cases. However, by inference, claims are made
that there are also large awards in medical malpractice cases.
As a consequence of the controversy, Madison and St. Clair counties and
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois were singled out for
particular attention. The Westlaw and Lexis databases (which incorporate the
Southwest Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter) were searched from 1992 through 2005
for all medical malpractice verdicts in those venues. To supplement the
summary descriptions contained in the verdict reporter I personally traveled to
Edwardsville, Illinois and examined the actual court files for each of the
identified cases. My goal was to check them for accuracy and to discover any
other relevant facts.
Madison County
Table 4.1 presents a summary of jury verdicts involving claims of medical
malpractice from 1992 through 2005.
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Table 4.1
Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases:
Madison County Court, 1992-2004
Year
Case Name
Verdict
1992 Buie v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center
Defense
1992 Hungate v. Allendorph
Defense
1992 Brown v. Afuwape
Defense
1992 Marshall v. Harley
Defense
1993 Garcia v. Tulyasthien
Plaintiff
1993 Beets v. Mucci
Plaintiff
1993 Krause v. Greaves
Defense
1994 Fisher v. Friedman
Plaintiff
1994 Rives v. Hamilton
Defense
1995 Pruett v. Mucci
Plaintiff
1995 Holbert v. Malench
Defense
1996 Barnes v. St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center Plaintiff
1996 Grant v. Petroff
Defense
1997 Finazzo v. Hill
Defense
1998 Lanz v. Chen
Defense
1999 Arnold v. Gittersonki
Defense
1999 Roberts v. Fernandez
Defense
2000 Adams v. Marrese
Plaintiff
2000 Knight v. Miller
Defense
2001 Lemons v. Dave
Plaintiff
2002 Wagoner v. Gingrich
Plaintiff
2002 Moffitt v. Skirball
Defense
2002 Jenkins v. Dai
Defense
2002 Terry v. Hamilton
Defense
2003 Budwell v. Freeman
Plaintiff
2005 Grant v. Petroff
Defense
* Settled for $174,000 versus verdict of $400,000

Verdict Amount
$0
$0
$0
$0
$600,000
$332,000
$0
$350,000
$0
$900,000
$0
$402,000 $174,000*
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$1,784,000
$0
$470,000
$75,000
$0
$0
$0
$25,000
$0

Table 4.1 indicates there were 26 reported jury trials involving medical
malpractice in Madison County from 1992 through 1995, an average of 1.7
trials per year. Nine of the 26 trials ended with an award for the plaintiff, a win
rate of 35 percent. The average award in those plaintiff wins was $523,333.
One award (Adams) exceeded $1 million and another (Pruett) approached $1
million. The awards in the table are not adjusted for inflation.
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Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized
Details about each of the plaintiff verdicts provide insights about the
nature of the claim and its eventual settlement. These details do not speak to
the issue of whether the case was decided properly. Additionally, in most
instances I could not independently verify pre-trial settlement offers reported in
the database. Further, in most instances, there were some exceptions; neither
the verdict reporter nor the court file provided data on whether the case was
finally settled for less than the jury verdict.89
Garcia v. Tulyasthien (1993)90 involved a claim of negligent surgery. The
plaintiff, age 33, claimed that a surgeon negligently inserted a metal rod in his
leg that was unnecessary, resulting in osteomyletitis, inflammation of the bone
and marrow. His past medical costs were $2500 and his wage loss was
$15,000.
Beets v. Mucci (1993)91 concerned the wrongful death of a 34 year old
mother of two children, ages 4 and 16. The patient had been treated for cervical
cancer and her estate claimed that Dr. Mucci had failed to remove all the
cancer during surgery. The jury verdict was $332,000.
Fisher v. Friedman (1994)92 involved a claim that the physician failed to
detect a detached retina and or refer the patient to a specialist. The claimed
result was the loss of one eye; five separate surgeries to reattach the retina
were not successful. The plaintiff claimed he was legally blind as a result. The
defendant physician admitted liability. Presumably the jury trial was about the
amount of damages. The plaintiff had demanded $750,000 before and during
trial and the defendant offered $600,000. The jury verdict was for $350,000,
about 58 % of the defendant’s offer. The parties settled following the plaintiff’s
post-trial motion for a new trial on damages.

89
90
91
92

The cases are identified in footnotes by the Madison County Court’s docket number.
91-L-1026
91-L-433
91-L-1646
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Pruett v. Mucci and St. Anthony’s Hospital (1995)93 involved permanent
neurological damage to the brain and spinal cord of a child during her mother’s
labor. The plaintiff’s guardian alleged failure to monitor during delivery and
inappropriate use of forceps. The jury concluded that Dr. Mucci was an agent
of the hospital. During trial the plaintiff demanded $750,000 to settle and the
defendant offered $250,000. The jury verdict of $900,000 involved the following
breakdown: past and future medical expenses, $200,000; past and future
disability, $250,000; past and future disfigurement, $250,000; past and future
pain and suffering, $200,000. The case settled for $875,000. Because the case
involved a minor the court record contains a formal settlement distribution
approved by a judge. $500,000 of the award was invested in an annuity to
provide the plaintiff with a guaranteed annual income with graduated income
amounts that would eventually provide $5600 per month for life (expected total
lifetime yield from the annuity would be over $4 million) over the plaintiff’s
lifetime. From the balance of $375,000, a lien (unspecified but likely Medicaid
or a private insurer) of $28,000 for medical expenses was deducted. Expert fees
and other litigation expenses amounted to slightly over $22,000. Under Illinois
fee structure the plaintiff’s lawyers received $281,000. The plaintiff received the
net balance of $43,437.
Barnes v. St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center (1996)94 involved a claim that the
medical staff of the hospital had failed to provide antiseptic conditions following
wrist surgery, had failed to monitor the infection, and negligence in
transporting him in the hospital during which the patient’s arm was “rammed”
into an elevator door, thereby pushing placement pins into a bone graft. As a
consequence, the plaintiff contended, an infection developed and additional
surgery was required. The treating physician was listed in the claim as having
knowledge of the facts but was not listed as a defendant. The plaintiff claimed
lost wages as well as medical expenses. The defense was based on the alleged
failure to show a proximate cause for the injuries. After the jury verdict of
93
94

91-L-823
92-L-994
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$402,000 the plaintiff requested the judge to increase the judgment because
the defense counsel had improperly mentioned in closing arguments that the
plaintiff’s $96,000 in medical costs were paid by insurance, thereby causing
the jury to deduct those expenses from the award. Approximately six weeks
after the verdict the trial judge entered a judgment, reducing the final award to
$228,000 on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims of wage loss were “too
speculative.” Shortly thereafter the parties settled the case for $174,000.
Adams v. Mareese (2000)95 involved a claim by a 29-year-old man that in
1992 the defendant performed three unnecessary fusion surgeries to the man's
neck requiring a fourth corrective surgery with an internal fixation. The alleged
result was a complete loss of range of neck motion, chronic pain, permanent
disability and inability to work for the remainder of his life. The claim involved
$91,000 in past medical expenses, approximately $140,000 in past wage loss
and approximately $400,000 in future wage loss. The defendant denied the
claims of negligence, stating that the original surgeries were necessary. The
jury awarded the plaintiff $1,784,000 divided as follows: $140,000 for past
wage loss; $400,000 for future wage loss; $90,000 for past medical expenses,
and $1,154,000 for disability, disfigurement and pain and suffering. The trial
judge affirmed the verdict and in the judgment commented on judicial
restraint “in response to defendant’s evasive answers, unsolicited elaborations,
and assorted courtroom shenanigans.” (judgment, page 26). The judgment
further noted that the defendant was chastised out of the presence of the jury
but threatened with chastisement in front of the jury for this behavior
(judgment, page 25). The defendant appealed to the 5th District Appellate Court
and then to the Illinois Supreme Court, but the appeals were denied (204 Ill.2d
655, 792 N.E.2d 305, 275 Ill. Dec. 74, June 4, 2003).

95

98-L-858
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Lemons v. Dave (2001)96 involved a claim of wrongful death for failure to
diagnose and treat bladder cancer in a timely manner; the delay of 25 months
allegedly resulted in a premature death. The mother of four children was 58
years old at the time of her death. The jury verdict was as follows: medical
expenses medical $70,000; pain and suffering, $250,000; husband of the
deceased, $50,000 for loss of money,services, society, and sexual relations; the
estate value of wife’s services, $50,000; reasonable society and loss of
companionship and sex, $50,000. Judgment affirming the jury verdict was
made on Dec 7, 2001. The verdict reporter notes that the plaintiff’s estate
reached a confidential settlement with another defendant named in the lawsuit,
suggesting that more money was recovered than reflected in the verdict.
Wagoner v. Gingrich (2002)97 involved a claim of a birth injury to the
shoulder and arm resulting in Erb’s palsy (nerve damage) and partial loss of
use of right arm. Medical specials were $5000. The defendant denied
negligence. Testimony indicated that, otherwise, the child was developing
normally. The jury awarded $75,000.
Budwell v. Freeman (2003)98 involved a claim by a woman in her late
thirties that the defendant performed a scheduled tubal ligation after child
birth, but the incision for the tubal ligation was made too close to an existing
umbilical hernia, causing post-operative complications resulting in an infection
in her abdomen for about 18 months, multiple corrective surgeries, permanent
abdominal scarring and pain and suffering. Medical expenses were claimed to
be approximately $12,000 and wage losses between $6,000 to $7,000. The
jury verdict was for $25,000.
Three Other Cases That Were Not Medical Negligence Verdicts
It is important to draw attention to the fact that three other awards were
identified that involved medical malpractice plaintiffs. In 1992 a Madison
96
97
98

99-LM-651
98-L-780
00-L-960
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County case, Bloome v. Wiseman

99involved

a legal malpractice award of

$3,238,000. The case concerned a lawyer who failed to properly represent a
patient involved in a malpractice lawsuit. The trial judge reduced the award to
$2.6 million, reflecting an assessment that the plaintiff had potential medical
damages of that amount. Robeen v. Walgreens100 involved a pharmacy error
that resulted in a person having seizures resulting in a jury verdict of $50,840.
In Hess v. Madison County Nursing Home101 in 2001 the estate of an eightyseven-year old patient sued for burns resulting from hot tea and received an
award of $14,000. A doctor was originally named in the suit but was dismissed
as a defendant before trial.
A Settlement Case
Resser v. Chand (1997)102 involved a claim that the defendant
attempted but failed to complete a colposcopy examination and subsequently
ordered surgery and performed an extensive conization which virtually
amputated the cervix. Plaintiff had significant abdominal pain after the
procedure and upon a return visit was first told of the type of surgery
performed, attributing the pain to the internal sutures. Plaintiff underwent a
laparoscopic examination and dilation of the cervical canal but continued to
experience uterine bleeding. Subsequently, plaintiff sought another opinion
from a different doctor who recommended a total hysterectomy and performed
such. The plaintiff claimed defendant breached the standard of care by
performing a conization, which was inappropriate for the abnormal PAP test
and contended that defendant misdiagnosed her condition as severe dysplasia
when the post-operative pathology report indicated no dysplasia was present.
Plaintiff claimed defendant also failed to type the HPV virus to determine
whether it was a specific species, which is a precursor of cancer and that the
defendant failed to obtain her informed consent for the conization procedure.
91-L-189
93-L-1211
101 98-L-931
102 98-L-1279
99

100
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The plaintiff further contended that the defendant falsified and/or negligently
altered medical records to reflect plaintiff’s informed consent. The case settled
for $275,000.
St Clair County
St. Clair County jury verdicts are contained in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: St. Clair Jury Verdicts 1993-2003
Year

Case name

Verdict

Verdict
Amount

1993

Holten v. Memorial Hospital

Plaintiff

1993
1994
1995
1995

Taylor v. Murphy
Smith
Karr v. Tschoe
Eggemeyer v. Metropolitan Ref
Labs and Simons
Earle v. Diehl
Abbitt v. Price
McClure v. Ramon
Restoff v. S.Ill. Surgical
Consultants
Eck v. Prosser
Trentman v. Associated
Orthopedic Surgeons
Sherrod v. Ramaswami
Mcginnis
Cretton v. Protestant Memorial
Medical Center

Defense
Defense
Defense
Plaintiff

$8,816,500
Retriala
$0
$0
$0
$0 b

Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense

$0
$0
$0
$0

Defense
Defense

$0
$0

1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
1999
2002
2003
2003

Plaintiff
Defense
Plaintiff

$250,000
$0
$0 d

c

Notes: a. Reversed and remanded by Ill. S. Ct but another defendant settled pre-trial
$2,950,000; b. Doctor not liable but $550,000 against hospital for “slip and fall;” c. Also
a civil rights claim with $150,000 in compensatory and punitive damages; d. Not
medical negligence but $950,000 against hospital for “slip and fall.”

The table shows one very large verdict of over $8 million that was
reversed by an appeals court, but the note draws attention to the fact that
another defendant in the case settled before trial for $2,950,000. Details are
reported in the next section. There was one other medical malpractice verdict
for $250,000. The notes to the table indicate that in two other cases doctors
were sued along with other parties but were found not liable for medical
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negligence but co-defendants were found liable on other grounds and
substantial damages were awarded. Details are provided in the next section. It
is noteworthy that the juries in these latter cases were clearly capable of
making distinctions between malpractice versus other claims.
Similar to Madison County, there is no evidence of runaway juries in
medical malpractice cases, especially over the last decade.
Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized
Holten v. Memorial Hospital (1993)103 claimed a hospital failed to properly
diagnose her condition She alleged that in 1990, she was admitted to
Memorial Hospital emergency room with complaints of numbness and tingling
in her lower extremities. She alleged that on the following day, the numbness
and tingling progressed to paralysis which was not noticed by the nurses on
the ward who took care of her. Plaintiff contended that two days after
admission, she was paralyzed in her lower extremities; the defendant had failed
to properly diagnose her condition and administer treatment before her
condition worsened. Memorial hospital asserted that her condition was
properly diagnosed at that time as being the result of a blood clot or circulation
failure in the spine. Further, in a cross claim Memorial alleged that the treating
physician had incorrectly diagnosed her condition to be caused by cancer, had
treated her for cancer and failed to properly treat an infection in her spine
which lead to the worsening of her condition. The jury awarded $8,706,500 to
the plaintiff and her spouse received $110,000. The trial judge agreed with the
verdict on liability but reduced the award by $1,500,000. Next the appellate
court afirmed the judgment on liability but reduced the award to $4,366,500.
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and ruled that the evidence
supported the jury’s determination that the failure of the hospital staff to report
the progression of the patient’s paralysis was a proximate cause of her
paralysis. However, the Court further concluded that the trial court’s stated
belief that a defense witness had been led by defense counsel to testify falsely
103

91-L-900
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and the plaintiff counsel’s prejudicial remarks during closing arguments
charging attorney misconduct denied the hospital a fair trial. In addition the
Court ruled that a jury instruction on aggravation of an injury caused by
another tortfeasor’s (the surgeon) negligence should not have been given and
that another instruction on proximate cause should not have been given. The
case was reversed and remanded back to the original trial court. No further
information could be found about the case, possibly indicating it settled.
However, it is noteworthy that a co-defendant, the plaintiff's treating
neurosurgeon, settled with plaintiff before trial for $2,950,000. Additional online research uncovered no evidence of a retrial or a settlement involving
Memorial Hospital.
Cretton v. Protestant Memorial Center (1993)104 involved a wrongful death
claim by the estate of a security guard, age 63, suffering from chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease and emphysema. The plaintiff’s estate claimed
that Cretton told her daughter after the transfer from one hospital unit to
another that, while she was being put in her bed, nurses had her stand on her
own, and she fell. She subsequently died and the coroner concluded that death
was caused by an injury to her brain. The defense contested the coroner’s
finding, claiming that the patient died of respiratory failure. The jury found
that Cretton's death was not caused by medical negligence on the part of the
hospital, but that the fall was, and awarded $950,000. The plaintiffs sought
noneconomic damages for the three days between Cretton's transfer and her
death, and for the loss of society, guidance, and support to her heirs.
Medical Malpractice and a Civil Rights Violation
Sherrod v. Ramaswami and Shroff (2002)105 is an unusual case. The
plaintiff was a convicted rapist who complained of abdominal pain and was
diagnosed with suspected appendicitis but the doctors did not take timely
additional action for over two weeks despite many complaints of severe pain by
104
105

00-L-64
97-63-GBC
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the man. Eventually a surgeon operated and found a ruptured appendix with
gangreen having spread to the intestines. The surgeon had to remove the
appendix, four inches of small intestine, three inches of large intestine and the
cecum, leaving the patient with a large scar and a risk of future intestinal
blockage. In addition to medical malpractice the plaintiff claimed a civil rights
violation. The jury awarded $250,000 for medical malpractice, $100,000
compensatory damages and $50,000 against Dr. Ramaswami , but found
defendant Shroff not liable.
A Settled Case
Eggemeyer v. Metropolitan Reference Laboratories and Simmons (1995)106
alleged an unnecessary mastectomy, pain and suffering by the laboratory
defendant and a physician. The patient was about 50 years old sought
treatment for a suspicious lump in her breast. A biopsy was performed but a
courier for the laboratory failed to deliver the specimen or the laboratory
misplaced it. Plaintiff alleged the doctor reviewed her options, which ranged
from monitoring her condition to a prophylactic mastectomy. A second biopsy
was not an option because virtually all suspicious tissue was removed. At some
point, the doctor relocated his practice and plaintiff sought another opinion.
Since plaintiff had a family history of breast cancer, the second doctor was very
concerned about an undiagnosed cancer and plaintiff decided to undergo a
modified radical mastectomy. However, after the procedure it was found that
there was no cancer present. Before trial the laboratory settled for $500,000
and the physician settled for $50,000.
Federal Cases In the Southern District of Illinois
Medical malpractice cases end up in federal rather than state courts
under two main circumstances. One circumstance is when one of the parties to
a lawsuit resides in another state; the case may be moved to a federal court
under “diversity” jurisdiction. The second circumstance is when the defendant
106

93-L-362
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is a federal agency, such as a VA hospital or a military hospital. However,
under this second circumstance the Federal Tort Claims Act requires that the
case be decided by a judge rather than by a jury.
Table 4.3 presents medical malpractice verdicts reported for federal
court of the Southern District of Illinois (located in East St. Louis).
Table 4.3 Federal Court Jury Medical Malpractice Verdicts,
Southern District of Illinois: 1992- 2003
Year
Case Name
1993 Taylor
1994 Ridenour v. Muller
1995 Cripps v. Union Pacific
and Heshmatpour
1995 Haas v. Group Health
Plan
1996 Kaufman v. Cserny
1997 Mandrell
2001 Treadway
2003 Mize

Verdict Amount
Defense
$0
Defense
$0
Plaintiff
$375,000
Plaintiff

$100,000

Defense
Defense
Defense
Defense

$0
$0
$0
$0

Table 4.3 shows that since 1992 there have been two plaintiff verdicts
from federal court juries involving claims related to medical malpractice. There
was an additional verdict involving a brain-injured child that resulted in a
verdict of $19,253,549. It was major news, but as explained below, it did not
involve a jury verdict.
Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized
Cripps v. Union Pacific and Heshmatpour(1995)107 involved a railroad worker
who was injured on the job and alleged permanent nerve damage to his left
elbow and inability to return to his job.. He alleged that the physician had been
negligent in performing surgery after a work injury. The defendant contended
that he had met the standard of care. Union Pacific was a defendant as part of a
“loan receipt agreement” called a “Mary Carter” agreement after a 1967 case
107

93-318
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involving a defendant , Mary Carter Paint Company. The verdict was for
$1,500,000 for the plaintiff against Union pacific and $175,000 against the
physician. From the $375,000 Union Pacific received $225,000 and the plaintiff
received an additional $155,000. Under the agreement Union Pacific paid
nothing to the plaintiff.
Haas v. Group Health Plan (1995)

108

involved a 45–year-old female plaintiff

who went for an ear cleaning. Her eardrum was perforated resulting in
temporary hearing loss and permanent high frequency loss. The plaintiff’s case
was based on the legal theory of res ipsa loquitur, that is, the injury speaks for
itself. The award was $100,000.
Trial by Judge Alone
Coleman v. United States of America and Touchette Regional Hospital (2003)
109

involved a claim against a physician considered a federal employee of the

United States. The plaintiff’s mother alleged that during the birthing process the
physician attempted to apply a vacuum extractor to the baby’s head about 15
times rather than the manufacturer’s recommendation of no more than three
times. The result was severe brain injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further
alleged that although a Caesarian Section was eventually performed it should
have been performed much earlier. The physician denied that fifteen attempts
were made with the vacuum extractor and claimed the injury was due to an
arrest of labor and the injury was attributed to an infection contracted by the
mother. Defendant Touchette Regional Hospital was dismissed from the suit
before trial. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the trial was by judge alone and
resulted in a verdict of $19,253,549. The plaintiff reportedly had offered to settle
for $8 million before trial and the defendant’s last offer was reported as $3.1
million. After a search of federal court cases in Westlaw no appeal of the verdict
could be found.

108
109

94-231
01-CV-314
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Conclusion
Over a 14-year period only 11 jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff were
uncovered in Madison and St. Clair county courts involving medical malpractice.
Only two verdicts exceeded one million dollars although a third for $900,000
approached one million. As with cases summarized in Chapter 3, different
persons can draw opposing conclusions about whether even the relatively few
plaintiff awards were justified, but in any event there is no evidence to support
the perception that medical malpractice jury trials in these counties are frequent
and outrageous in their generosity to plaintiffs.
The data reported in this chapter do not speak to settlements resulting in
payments without resort to jury trial. Research in other jurisdictions indicates
that settlements outnumber jury trials by about nine settlements to one trial.
The public debate has been about jury verdicts, however.
The reputation of these two counties has been affected by the linking
controversy over asbestos litigation and medical malpractice litigation in mass
media reports and the claims of tort-reform proponents. The reputation may
have been further enhanced by media accounts of the very large award in the
Coleman case in the Federal Court. The case was decided by a federal judge, not
a jury.
The central conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is this: Insofar as
medical malpractice litigation is concerned, the reputation of Madison and St.
Clair counties as “judicial hellholes” is not supported by hard data.
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Chapter 5
Caps on Pain and Suffering
One of the central proposals for tort reform in medical malpractice
involves a cap of $500,000 on the pain and suffering component of awards.
One source, without documentation, reported that non-economic damages
“…now make up more than 90 percent of the money awarded by Illinois
juries.”110
This chapter returns to the jury awards from Cook and DuPage counties
presented in Chapter 3 to examine issues related to “pain and suffering.” Its
intent is to provoke deeper thought about the pain and suffering component of
awards. Fundamental changes in tort law should not be taken lightly and
without such consideration.
The data in Chapters 3 and 4 have challenged some widely held
assumptions about jury awards, and the data in Chapter 6 will offer an
additional challenge, namely that the evidence of doctors fleeing Illinois is not
supported by any reliable data and in fact is contradicted by statistics collected
by the American Medical Association.
Re-Examining Cook-DuPage Jury Awards in 2001
Table 5.1 describes all 30 plaintiff verdicts from Cook and DuPage
counties in 2001. In most cases, although not all, the summary from the Cook
County Jury Verdict Reporter described the various elements that made up the
damage award, including the pain and suffering component. The summaries
allow us to make a rough estimate of what the verdict would have been if the
judge had been required to reduce the pain and suffering component of the
award to $500,000. Recall also, that in a number of cases the settlement was
less than the verdict due to high-low agreements, settlements for the amount of
the liability insurer’s coverage, or for other reasons.

110

Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 1, 2004.
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The first column reports the case. The second column is the jury verdict.
The third column reports any adjustment to the verdict that the judge would
have applied if the pain and suffering component of the award exceeded
$500,000. The fourth column reports any known settlement amount that
differed from the verdict. The remaining columns report the itemized verdict
elements. The pain and suffering component of the award is in the fourth
column, allowing the reader to see how much the jury award differed from the
$500,000 cap.
Table 5.1: Estimating Effects of a $500,000 Cap on Pain and Suffering

Case

Verdict

Cap Adjust Settlement

Pain &
Suffering

Loss
Society/
Medical and
Loss of
Wrongful
Disfigurement
income loss
Normal Life
Death/
Loss
Consortium

Bryant

$30,000,000 $26,500,000 $1,100,000 $4,000,000 $ 16, 476,000 $4,000,000

Lawler

$3,800,000

Brewster

$170,000

Asceves

$467,000

E. Munoz

$2,495,893

D. Munoz

$150,000

$1,800,000

$2,500,000
$150,000

$100,000
$20,000
$32,900

$1,870,000
$0

McNamara $317,000

$1,000,000 $887,300

$500,000

$100,000

$50,000

$280,000

$37,000

Matthews

$3,781,393

Genovese

$494,906

??

??

Willis

$120,608

??

??

Bales

$31,393

$2,812,553

$500,000

$715,723

Washington $200,000
Gonzales

$1,191,256

Walisczek

$6,500,000

Stajsczyk

$801,643

Thomas

$835,000

Matei

$525,000

$100,000
$1,091,256

$2,500,000

Cork

$5,300,000

Simpson

$2,563,492

$600,000

$800,000

??

$750,000
$100,000

$141,256

$800,000
$0
$450,000

??
$800,000

$835,000
??

??

$2,000,000
$2,000,000

$298,052
$1,000,000

$1,000,000 $500,000

$0
$1,963,492

Cummings $1,250,000
Salas

$950,000

$3,750,000

$1,643

Skonieczny $13,298,052
Christy

$1,200,000

$1,900,000 $1,100,000 $263,492

$550,000

$500,000

$250,000

$500,000

$650,000

$2,750,000

Guerin

$7,622,040

$7,122,040

Banis

$1,710,000

$1,640,000

Perrier

$218,626

Schlindler

$1,262,748

Macias

$1,500,000

$1,000,000

Carroll

$7,962,024

$7,462,024

$7,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,622,040

$5,000,000

$570,000

$570,000

$570,000

$100,000

$68,626

$50,000

$200,000

$462,748

$600,000

$1,000,000 $42,705
$2,000,000 $1,000,000 $5,962,024
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$0
$457,295

$1,000,000

Column 3 in the table shows that the cap would have reduced the jury’s
verdict in ten of the 30 cases: Bryant, Lawler, E. Munoz, Gonzales, Christy,
Simpson, Guerin, Banis, Macias, and Carroll.

But wait. Look at column 4.

Bryant settled for $1,100,000, far less than jury’s award for economic damages.
The cap made no difference in the settlement outcome. Similarly, Gonzales
settled for less than the cap adjustment. So did Simpson, Guerin and Carroll.
Thus, five cases of the 30 would have been affected by the caps: Lawler,
E. Munoz, Christy, Banis, and Macias. The verdicts in Munoz, Christy, and
Macias would have been $500,000 less. In Banis the cap would have reduced
the jury’s award by $70,000. Lawler resulted in the biggest reduction, namely
$2 million.
In some cases, the breakdown of the elements of the verdict was not
reported and these are noted with question marks, but the total verdicts of
these cases were, in any event, below the $500,000 limit of the proposed cap.
Readers may note that in addition to medical and income losses, jury
verdicts described in Table 5.1 also included damages for disfigurement, loss of
a normal life, loss of society, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Under
Illinois law these elements of damages have important economic consequences
bearing on claims even though there is no fixed metric by which the amounts
can be assessed. The determination of amounts is left to the jury under the
supervision of the judge.111
Recognition of the economic component to so-called “non- economic
damages” is a common source of confusion about “pain and suffering.”112 Pain
and suffering is only one component of “non-economic” damages. In some
states and textbooks, alternative terms of “special” and “general” damages are

111

See generally, Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civ. 30.04.03 (2005 ed.); Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civ.
34.02 (2005 ed.); WEST'S SMITH-HURD ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUTES ANNOTATED and
cases cited in the annotations.
CHAPTER 740. CIVIL LIABILITIES, ACT 180. WRONGFUL DEATH ACT, 180/1. Action for
damages
112 For more discussion see, Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross and Mary Rose, Jury Awards For
Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW 265
(1998).
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used. This partially avoids the problem of conflation of pain and suffering with
other kinds of damages, such as described above. In short, the claim in one
mass media report that more than 90 percent of Illinois jury awards are for
“non-economic” damages

113

might be true—better data would be needed—but

this does not mean that 90 percent of jury awards in medical malpractice cases
are for pain and suffering.
Indeed, although data are missing for breakdowns of damages in some
cases, a very rough estimate of the proportion of the total awards that pain and
suffering represented in the cases reported in Table 5.1 can be obtained
dividing the total of the pain and suffering (column 5) by the total of the jury
verdicts (column 2). By this rough calculation “pain and suffering” constitutes
only 15% of verdicts. Perhaps if the missing data were known and added in, the
percentage would be higher. But even if the missing information doubled the
figure - an unlikely projection - the percentage would be a far cry from 90%.
Recall that, as discussed in Chapter 2, jury verdicts constitute ten
percent or less of all payments to claimants. Recall also that Cook and DuPage
counties contain half of Illinois’ population and two-thirds of its doctors and
that the data show that Madison and St. Clair counties yield jury verdicts less
or equal to Cook and DuPage counties, so it is reasonable to assume that these
findings can be generalized to all of Illinois. One conclusion to be drawn from
the above discussion is that a $500,000 cap on pain and suffering, while
significantly decreasing awards to some individual plaintiffs, would have
minimal impact on overall payments to claimants in medical malpractice in
Illinois.
Some might argue that the above conclusion does not consider the
“shadow effect” of jury verdicts. No direct answer can be given to this claim.
However, given the likely minimal impact that a $500,000 cap would have on
jury verdicts, this claim would not appear to have much logical substance.114
Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 1, 2004
Research on malpractice liability insurer files from North Carolina led researchers to
conclude that insurers and defense lawyers settle cases primarily on the basis of their own
113
114
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It is important to note here that a study conducted by the U.S.
Government Accounting Office in 2003 studied four states with pain and
suffering caps of $250,000, four states with caps of $500,000 and 11 states
without such caps.115 The study found that while medical liability insurance
premiums increased in all states, they were lower in states with caps, as were
claims payments. On the other hand the GAO also qualified the findings:
“Moreover, differences in both premiums and claims payments are also affected
by multiple factors in addition to damage caps, and we could not determine the
extent to which differences among states were attributable to the damage caps
or to additional factors.”
As the GAO report properly recognized, there are multiple factors that
influence premiums and claim payments, and it is often impossible to separate
causes or the contribution of separate factors to outcomes, such as claims and
premiums.
A report by Weiss Ratings, a respected insurance analyst, found that
caps on pain and suffering reduced the amounts recovered by plaintiffs but did
not result in insurers reducing doctors’ insurance premiums.116
In 2003 GE Medical Protective Company, the nation’s largest medical
malpractice insurer, reported to the Texas Department of Insurance as follows:
“Non-economic damages are a small percentage of total losses
paid. Capping non-economic damages will show loss savings of
1.0%.”117

internal assessments of whether the standard of care was violated, Ralph Peeples, et al., The
Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37, WAKE FOREST
LAW REVIEW 877 (2002). Research by Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and
Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 1780 (1992) on medical malpractice cases in New Jersey is also consistent with this
view. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993) at 89-113, conducted research on
closed claims in Florida that also is supportive of such a conclusion.
115 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE , GAO-03-836 (2003)
116 See MARTIN D. WEISS, WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF
NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS AND AVAILABILITY OF
COVERAGE 7-8 (2003) available at http://www.weissratings.com/malpracticecap.asp.
117 See http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/rp/rp004689.pdf.
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The company also said that a provision in the Texas law allowing for
periodic payments of awards would provide a savings of only 1.1%. Medical
Protective eventually raised the rates on its physician policyholders.
Table 5.1 and the discussion associated with it cannot provide a definite
answer as to whether a $500,000 cap on pain and suffering would have an
effect on claim payments and ultimately a secondary effect on doctors’ liability
insurance premiums, but it raises important questions about whether a cap
would be effective. It also begs questions of fairness.
Fairness Considerations: Two Studies on the Effects of Caps
It is important to consider two additional studies. They address the issue
of the fairness of caps and raise questions about justice for claimants. In the
medical malpractice tort reform debate, most of the rhetoric on both sides has
addressed the plight of doctors and liability insurers and the potential
implications for availability of health care. Little of the discussion has
addressed the plight of persons who are injured by medical negligence and
make claims.118
Research by Lucinda Finley has examined the consequences of caps on
the allocation of plaintiff recoveries in California, Florida, and Maryland by
looking at jury verdicts and calculating the discrepancy between what the jury
awarded and the amount the plaintiff would recover under caps.119 She found
that the major effects would fall most heavily on children, women, and elderly
people because their losses are more likely to be non-economic losses, albeit
often devastating and tragic.
David Studdert and his colleagues conducted a study of California jury
verdicts to assess the impact of California’s $250,000 cap on non-economic
damages and concluded as follows:
118

See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the
Contingency Fee System, Juries and Social Policy, LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW (2005, in
Press).
119 Lucinda Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 1263, 1281,
1286, 1308-1312 (2004).
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Plaintiffs with the most severe injuries appear to be at highest
risk for inadequate compensation. Hence, the worst-off may
suffer a kind of “double jeopardy.”
Analysis of proportional reductions shows that the burden of
caps tends to fall on injuries that cause chronic pain and
disfigurement but do not lead to declines in physical
functioning that would generate lost work time or high health
care costs…. Notwithstanding their limited economic impact,
the injuries involved are by no means trivial.120
The findings from these two studies raise questions about the fairness of
caps on negligently injured persons. Perhaps some readers will conclude that
these are less important considerations in overall health care policy, but it
seems important to raise them.
To consider these fairness issues further, readers may wish to turn back
to the summaries of some of the cases reported in Chapter 3. In Carroll v.
Barrows a child in his first year of life had undiagnosed eye cancer. Despite
radiation and chemotherapy treatments he eventually lost sight in both eyes.
The jury awarded him $1 million for pain and suffering. In Simpson v. Allswede
improper intubation of an eight-year-old boy resulted in a tracheostomy
followed by 30 surgical procedures. The traceostomy was in place for five years,
preventing him from speaking and at 16 has permanent throat damage,
although he can now speak. The jury awarded $1.1 million for pain and
suffering. In Gonzales v. Pla a doctor failed to diagnose kidney disease in a
man, age 44. He was required to undergo dialysis when his kidneys failed and
then received a kidney transplant. The jury awarded $600,000 for pain and
suffering. In Lawler v. Lomont a female special education assistant, age 33,
suffered delayed diagnosis of cancer when a physician misread her pap smears
over a two-year period. The defendant admitted liability. The cancer spread
and a radical hysterectomy was required. The woman obviously cannot have
120 David Studdert et al, Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in
California, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 54 (2004). A footnote omitted in the above quotation references
Frank Sloan and C.R. Hsieh, Variabilty in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation
Fair? 24 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 601 (1990) which also pointed out a similar inequity in pre1990 cases.
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children and suffers from fear that the cancer will recur. The jury awarded $2.5
million for pain and suffering.
Are the amounts awarded for these injuries too much? That is a matter
on which reasonable people can disagree. It is important to consider cases like
the one described above. Fairness issues for patients injured from medical
negligence are all too often neglected in public debate about caps on pain and
suffering.
Summary
Serious issues can be raised about whether a cap on pain and suffering will
reduce doctors’ insurance premiums. The chapter also discusses the proportion
of jury awards that are for “pain and suffering” and discusses justice issues
related to the patients who might be affected by caps.
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Chapter 6121
Doctors in Illinois: 1993-2003
One of the concerns about jury verdicts and the tort system is that as a
result of jury verdicts and their impact on settlements doctors may be leaving
the State of Illinois for other states.122
To

examine

these

claims,

I

researched

the

American

Medical

Association’s Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US, an annual
publication that provides a number of important statistics about doctors,
including county breakdowns by state, some information on certain specialties
and state-by-state comparisons of physician-to-population ratios.
Qualifiers to the Statistics
There is a two–year time lag between the date of the publication and the
statistics. Thus, for example, the 2005 edition presents data on doctors as of
December 31, 2003.123 Consequently, the data reported in this chapter begin
with 1993 and end at 2003. The data cannot speak to changes in Illinois
doctors after that period. Some of the statistics were used in Chapter 3 to
assess numbers of claims in relation to treating physicians, but this chapter
examines doctors as a primary variable.
There are additional qualifications to these data. The first is that I have
limited the analyses to non-federal “Total Patient Care Physicians,” as reported
in the statistics. Some physicians are federal employees, such as those
associated with military bases, Veterans Administration Hospitals, and the
Public Health Service. These physicians are not affected by the liability
121

I want to thank my Duke colleague and co-author, Dr. Paul Lee, who offered comments and suggestions on a
draft of this chapter.
122
Illinois Chamber of Commerce as of April 24, 2005 at < http://www.ilchamber.org>, 2005 State Interactive
Systems Ranking Study, Harris Interactive, Inc. Fact Sheet: “Illinois’ abusive legal climate is forcing doctors to
leave the state,” Press release of March 8, 2005; Editorial, Illinois Supreme Court, Buying Justice, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, November 5, 2004 at B6; Patrick Powers, Doctors Flee Hospitals in the Area, BELLEVILLE NEWS
DEMOCRAT, Wed March 23,2005; Georgina Gustin and Phil Dine, Lax Insurance Regulation Is Core of Malpractice
Crisis, SAINT LOUIS POST DISPATCH, January 1, 2005.
123
American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE US. The editions used
in this chapter begin in 1995 and end in 2005.
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insurance crisis since the United States Government assumes tort liability for
these providers, and malpractice claims are adjudicated under the Federal Tort
Claims Act that provides for trial by judge alone. Other physicians are
employed by insurance carriers or pharmaceutical companies.
Some physicians list themselves as inactive and a few remain
unclassified in the AMA statistics.124 Thus in 2003 Illinois had a total of 37,608
physicians, of whom 30,264 classified themselves as non-federal physicians
focused on patient care, although of this number 3,147 classified themselves
as “inactive.”125 Some physicians may only be working part-time and others
may have limited their practices, e.g., abandoned surgery, certain types of
surgery, or stopped delivering babies.
Illinois Physicians: 1993-2003
Of the 37,608 private physicians in Illinois in 2003, fully 30,264 were
classified as patient care physicians. The remainder were designated as “other
professional activity” (1,772), “inactive” (3,147) and “not classified” (2,425). The
“not classified” physicians may or may not be treating physicians and “inactive”
physicians might still carry liability insurance. However, for purposes of the
analyses, I chose the AMA’s definition of “Total Patient Care Physicians”
The statistics provide some general breakdowns as to how physicians
classify their practice, but these are self-designations and do not provide
estimates of types of actual patient care. Thus, an obstetrician/gynecologist
may not deliver babies as part of his or her practice or may refer difficult cases
to another obstetrician. A surgical specialist may conduct only low-risk surgery
and avoid high-risk operations. A physician whose classification is “Family
Medicine/General Practitioner” may conduct surgery or deliver babies.

124

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE US, 2005 Edition,
at xix-xxiii.
125
Id at page 222, Table 3.11
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Table 6.1 allows examination of trends in the total number of patient
care physicians with separate breakdowns for Obstetric-gynecologists and
Neurological surgeons. The two specialty groups are alleged to have been most
affected by the liability insurance problem.
Table

6.1: Patient Care Physicians in Illinois: 1993-2003

Year

2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993

Total
Patient
Care
Doctors
30264
29,135
29,116
28,730
27,779
27,630
27,733
26,758
26,054
25,020
24,514

Obstetrics- Neurological
Gynecology Surgery
1814
1774
1769
1796
1715
1800
1785
1734
1669
1547
1596

212
205
199
209
207
205
208
204
213
192
191

Table 6.1 shows a steady increase in the absolute number of Illinois’ total
patient care physicians. With some year-to-year variations the trend is upward
or steady for Ob-Gyns and neurological surgeons.
But how do these trends track against changes in Illinois’ population?
The AMA‘s data also provide information on the total number of physicians per
100,000 population and physician-population ratios ranked by state. These
data are reported in Table 6.2 and are based on total non-federal doctors
versus patient care doctors.
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Table 6.2: Patient Care Physicians Per 100,000 Persons
and Relative State Ranking: 1993-2003

2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993

Patient
Care
Physicians Rank
Among
Year /100,000
States
persons
239
17
235
15
237
13
231
11
229
12
233
11
235
11
226
11
221
11
213
13
211
13

Table 6.1 shows that the total number of patient care physicians and
physicians in obstetrics-gynecology and neurological surgery have steadily
increased in Illinois since 1993. Table 6.2 shows that adjusted for Illinois
population growth the ratio of patient care physicians has also increased.
Table 6.2 does show that Illinois’ ranking in patient care population to
physician ratios has slipped relative to other states. It is not clear what should
be made of this last finding. It could be interpreted as Illinois losing out to
other states. An alternative way of looking at the data in the table is that
Illinois’ increase in the population to physician ratio is just slower relative to
other states.
The other problem with rankings is that rankings they tend to exaggerate
small differences. Consider that in 2002 New Hampshire was ranked 16th with
a 240 ratio; Oregon was ranked 22nd with a 235 ratio; Virginia was ranked 12th
with a 244 ratio; and Washington was ranked 16th with a 237 ratio. In 2003
the rankings and ratios had changed: New Hampshire was ranked 14th with a
240 ratio; Oregon was ranked 18th with a 235 ratio; Virginia was ranked 12th
76

with a 244 ratio; and Washington was ranked 16th with a 303 ratio. Thus, New
Hampshire increased in its ranking even though it dropped four figures in the
ratio of patients to physicians. Oregon maintained the same ratio but jumped
from 22nd up to 18th. A state with a small population can gain or lose a
relatively small number of doctors and that will substantially alter the ratio. If
a state with a large population gains or loses the same number of doctors as
the small state, the ratio will hardly be affected.
In short, the rankings were included in Table 6.2 because it was proper
to do so as well as to avoid any appearance that the data are not fully
presented. However, as explained immediately, above rankings can be very
misleading. The bottom line is that the number of patient-treating physicians
in Illinois has increased, not decreased.
Patient Care Physicians: Madison and St. Clair Counties 1993-2003
Madison and St Clair counties have received special attention. A
November 2003 Article in the Belleville News Democrat quoted a Memorial
Hospital spokesman as saying

“the hospital has lost 59 doctors since the

beginning of the year.”126 One report in 2004 stated: “[a]t least 60 doctors in
the past two years have left or announced plans to leave Madison and St. Clair
counties.”

127

In March 2005 the Belleville News Democrat put the figure at

136.128 The Springfield Journal Register, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, and the
Wall Street Journal have reported that the two counties’ hospitals have lost 161
physicians.129 The figure of 136 is based on a study by Navin and Sullivan on

126

Patrick Powers, Doctor Exodus Continues, Belleville NEWS DEMOCRAT, Nov 9, 2003 at
<,http:/www.Belleville.com/mld/newsdemocrat/7218042.htm>.
127
Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 2004
<http:/www.heartlend.org/Article.cfm?artId=14633>.
128
Patrick Powers, Doctors Flee Area Hospitals, March 23, 2005 at <
http:/www.jobsillinois.us/news/contentview.asp?c=150575>.
129
Dean Olson, Shimkus: Chance for Malpractice Caps Getting Better, JOURNAL REGISTER February 24, 2005;
William Lamb, Illinois Trauma Cases Surge at SLU, POST DISPATCH , Monday January 10, 2005; Sherman Joyce,
Judicial Hellholes, WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 15, 2004 at A 20 .
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the health Care Sector in Madison and St. Clair counties and will be discussed
below.130 It is not clear where or how the other figures originated.
Unfortunately, the AMA data do not extend into 2004 and 2005 to
directly address all of these claims. Nevertheless, data up to 2003 may give
insights that can prompt additional discussion.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide statistics on doctors in Madison and St. Clair
counties, respectively, from 1993 through 2003. These statistics deal only with
non-federal physicians. They are disaggregated by the self-described practices
of the physicians.
Table 6.3: Non-federal Physicians in Madison County
with Breakdowns for Practice Areas: 1993-2003

Year
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993

Total Family/
Hospital
Total
Not
Surgical
Other
Patient General Medical
Based
Physicians Care Practice Specialties Specialties Specialties Practice Other Inactive Classified
338
280
39
94
72
50
25
5
44
9
341
286
37
99
72
53
25
6
39
10
341
292
38
100
75
58
21
7
33
9
328
282
37
98
73
58
16
7
28
11
334
279
34
94
77
60
14
8
28
19
332
277
34
90
78
59
16
8
28
2
329
277
30
83
74
58
32
8
32
12
328
281
32
87
78
59
25
8
28
11
318
266
35
78
73
57
23
8
32
12
316
275
37
73
74
64
27
8
29
4
317
274
36
75
74
61
28
6
29
8

130

John Navin and Timothy Sullivan, Recommended for a Healthy Economy: The Importance of the Health Care
Sector in Madison and St. Clair Counties, SIU , Edwardsville, March 2005.
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Table 6.4: Non-federal Physicians in St. Clair County
with Breakdowns for Practice Areas: 1993-2003

Year
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993

Total Family/
Hospital
Total
Not
Surgical
Other
Patient General Medical
Based
Physicians Care Practice Specialties Specialties Specialties Practice Other Inactive Classified
526
431
72
112
85
78
84
15
60
20
503
402
67
112
81
84
58
19
60
22
494
402
57
116
82
87
60
19
60
13
493
396
56
117
78
86
59
17
59
21
456
356
48
102
82
80
44
19
60
21
432
348
48
100
81
72
47
16
52
16
386
320
33
95
78
72
42
15
48
3
376
312
38
88
74
73
39
15
43
6
354
292
37
87
72
65
31
13
43
6
351
298
40
86
71
65
36
15
34
4
345
297
45
79
74
60
39
11
33
4

Table 6.3 shows a slight drop in total patient care physicians in 2002
and 2003 in Madison County compared to 2001. But 2001 appears to be an
anomalous year with respect to total number of treating physicians in the
sense that instead of a slow rise in the number of physicians by one or two
annually the number jumped by 10. On the other hand the number of
“inactive” physicians increased steadily so that in 2003 fully 40 physicians
stated they were inactive.
In contrast to Madison, St. Clair County shows a steady increase in both
total number of physicians and the total number of patient care physicians and
a big jump in the number of physicians describing themselves as having a
hospital-based practice.
One could ascribe the drop in total patient care physicians and increase
in inactive physicians in 2003 to increased liability insurance premiums, but
the problem with this interpretation is that it is contradicted by the increase in
treating doctors and the stable rate of inactive doctors in St. Clair County.
Doctors in St. Clair County were presumably exposed to the same rates of
liability insurance premiums as those in Madison County. Perhaps the
explanation lies in shifting demographics, even including the possibility that
some doctors have shifted their offices from Madison County to St. Clair
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County. Perhaps another clue lies in the big jump in hospital-based practice in
St. Clair in 2003.
The data do not allow conclusions on these hypotheses, but they do
invite closer examination and research on issues that may arise. However,
taken as a whole, the data for the combined two counties are not consistent
with a sudden decrease in the availability of physicians overall. A simple
calculation from data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows that in 2003 there were 711
private patient care physicians in the two counties compared to 678 in the year
2000, a year just before the liability insurance premiums began to increase.
Put in percentage terms in 2003 the number of patient care physicians had
actually increased by four percent.
The data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do not address the claim that 56 or 60 or
161 physicians have left the Madison-St. Clair county area as of 2005 since the
data extend only to 2003. But they do pose a serious need to document the
claim. Does the claim include federal doctors who are transferred or otherwise
move from one federal facility to another? Is the figure of 60-161 doctors a net
loss or gross loss? Doctors retire or move away from areas, medical residents
finish their residencies and move to different locations, but often other doctors
replace them. The central issue is net loss not gross loss.
The data are also inconsistent with the Navin and Sullivan report on
Madison and St. Clair counties131 that apparently gave rise to the claims of the
loss of 136 to 161 doctors in the area. Their report was concerned with
employment in the health sector, including support staff, and used two sources
of data. One source was the number of physicians’ offices in the counties
through 2002.132 They concluded that the number of physician offices dropped
by about 2.5% between 1998 and 2002.

131

John Navin and Timothy Sullivan, Recommended for a Healthy Economy: The Importance of the Health Care
Sector in Madison and St. Clair Counties, SIU , Edwardsville, March 2005.
132
Id at 10.
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These figures do not correspond with calculations we can make with the
AMA’s figures that can be calculated from Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Combining total
physicians for the two counties yields the following finding: In 1998 there were
764 total physicians and in 2002 there were 844 physicians, a gain of 10
percent. If we limit the calculations to treating physicians, the figures for 1998
and 2002 are, respectively, 673 and 688, a gain of two percent. By either
measure the AMA figures show a gain, not a loss of physicians.
The second measure used by Navin and Sullivan was hospital staff
listings from six area hospitals for the years 2002 through 2004. After culling
for duplicate names those authors identified 798 physicians listed in 2004
compared to 934 physicians, a difference of 136, or 15 percent. Their figures
for 2002 again appear different from the AMA data indicating a total of 844
physicians (688 treating physicians) in 2002. One plausible hypothesis for the
discrepancy probably lies in the fact that this measure from the Navin and
Sullivan report is based on physicians with hospital privileges. These listings
could include physicians from out of the area or even from out of the state, e.g.,
Missouri. Federal as opposed to non-federal physicians may also be listed in
their data. The difference could also be due to changes in the way that doctors
practiced medicine or how hospitals classified physicians.
There are possibly other plausible explanations, but the Navin and
Sullivan data based on hospital staff listings are clearly not a good source of
data for estimating the number of physicians or changes in the number of
physicians.
The American Medical Association statistics are clearly the official and
superior source of data. Their statistics data for 2004 will eventually allow a
further comparison with the Navin and Sullivan findings and might, in the end,
support their conclusions by showing a loss of physicians. Nevertheless, it
should be clear that their research should not be relied on for a source of
support for estimating losses or gains of physicians in Madison and St. Clair
counties.
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The AMA statistics for 2003 also are inconsistent with the Memorial
Hospital spokesperson’s claim that that hospital alone lost 59 doctors. Perhaps
the statement was accurate but omitted replacement doctors. If many of the 59
doctors were medical residents finishing their period of residency, they would
have been expected to leave but would be replaced by new doctors working on
their residency.
In short, the AMA statistics through 2003 do not support claims of a loss
of doctors in Madison and St.Clair counties.
Conclusion
As of the year 2003, the American Medical Association’s statistics do not
provide support for a claim that doctors are leaving the State of Illinois or that
the number of non-Federal physicians has decreased in the Madison-St.Clair
county area. Changes may have indeed occurred since 2003, but proponents of
the claim of major losses of doctors have not substantiated their claims in any
sources that I could find.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This report opened with the assumption that the medical insurance
liability premiums for Illinois’ doctors have increased dramatically in recent
years. Nothing in this report challenges that assumption. The findings of the
research in the report, however, strongly challenge widely made claims about
the role of the Illinois tort system as a cause of the increase in these premiums.
Data
Claims have been made that the number of lawsuits has increased
dramatically in recent years. Data on medical malpractice lawsuit filings in
Cook and DuPage counties give no support to this claim. Claims have been
made that there has been an increase in jury trials. Data from the United
States Bureau of Statistics study of civil litigation indicate that the number of
jury trials in 2001 in Cook County and DuPage counties actually decreased
when compared to 1996. Data from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter
showed that combined data from Cook and DuPage counties showed that, with
the exception of a modest fluctuation in 2002, the number of trials remained
steady between 2001 and 2004. Data also showed that the actual payouts were
often much smaller than the jury verdicts.
Claims have been made that Madison and St. Clair counties are “judicial
hell holes” for doctors. Data showed that from 1992 through the first quarter of
2005 there was a total of 26 medical malpractice jury trials—1.7 trials per
year--and that plaintiffs prevailed only 11 times in this 14-year period. Only
two awards exceeded $1 million. Claims have been made that a cap on pain
and suffering will alleviate some of the large awards and lead to reduced
premiums. The data suggest that the effects of caps would likely be minimal
and possibly result in unfairness to negligently injured patients.
Claims have been made that doctors were leaving the state of Illinois for
states with more benign litigation climates. Data from the American Medical
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Association show that from 1993 through 2003 the actual number of patient
care physicians has increased steadily in absolute numbers and in the ratios of
population to physicians. Claims have been made that large numbers of
doctors in the Madison and St. Clair counties have been fleeing or retiring from
practice as a result of its litigation climate. Not according to the American
Medical Association statistics through 2003. Compared to the year 2000 the
number of patient care doctors actually increased by four percent.
Missing Data
The publicly available data did not allow an assessment of actual
payouts from settlements, the litigation costs from claims in which no
payments were made, or costs for paid cases in which payments were made.
These and many other variables that could have shed additional light on the
current debate exist in closed claim files of the Illinois Department of
Insurance.
Clearly these data should be made available to the public as they are in
Florida and Texas. Doctors and patients and interest groups on both sides of
the controversy, indeed the citizens who pay taxes to have these important data
collected, should have a right to know. The controversy regarding health care
should be resolved with data rather than by anecdote and questionable
statistics.
If Not the Tort System…?
Think of a crude analogy. A patient goes to the doctor with a sore throat
and other symptoms. The doctor suspects a bacterial infection, takes a throat
swab, and sends it to a laboratory. The report comes back negative. That cause
eliminated, the doctor then begins to look for other causes of the ailment.
For more than a quarter century the American civil jury system and the
citizens who serve on it have been defamed by variations on the claim that
juries too often “act like Santa Claus handing out millions of dollars in cases
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involving comparably minor injuries.”133 The best data for Illinois that were
available for this report indicate that juries are not to blame for the problems
involving the increases in doctor’s liability premiums. It is time to look for other
causes of the ailment. Some have been suggested but that is beyond the scope
of this report. 134
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